

MURRAY'S LECTURES AT JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

February - March 1942

The following is the transcription of John Courtney Murray's lectures on "Religion and Society," given at Jewish Theological Seminary in New York City in February and March 1942. It is not clear whether the transcription was made by a stenographer recording Murray's actual lecture or on the basis of some kind of mechanical recording. The transcriber did not always grasp what Murray was saying, and at certain points it is possible and necessary to correct it in the light of the extensive notes from which Murray spoke and which can be found in the Woodstock College Archives.

LECTURE I - FEBRUARY 10, 1942

I cannot forbear remarking how honored I feel to have been invited to speak to a gathering as distinguished as this; and I want to express also my gratitude to Dr. Finkelstein and to the Institute for Religious Studies for the courtesy and thoughtfulness that characterized all the arrangements for this lecture.

In asking me, as a Catholic, to discuss the problem of religion and society--in Catholic perspectives, obviously--I suppose the questions that might be touched on would be the following: You might wish to know whether the Catholic Church conceives herself to have a socio-temporal mission; that is to say, whether she feels called upon to exercise, in the field of human culture and civilization, an action for the benefit of mankind, and to exercise that action particularly in the social sphere, in all its different aspects: national society, domestic society, international society.

You might ask further whence is this mission derived? Has it been simply assumed, or does the Church conceive herself to have it as the result of the [*sic*: a?] Divine Commission?

You might ask further what the relation of this socio-temporal mission of the Church to her specifically religious mission is; that is to say, her mission as the guardian of eternal values, as the depositary of truth, or, in a word, as a society whose aim and end is, of course, the Glory of God.

What has such a society to do with the organization of human life on the socio-temporal plane?

You might ask, too, whether or not she conceives her part with reference to Christ-human [*sic*: Christian?] civilization to be a necessary one; or does she aim simply at being useful--a useful supplement of secular agencies?

There are a great many other questions that you might possibly ask of me. You might ask, for instance, what is the Church's analysis of contemporary society, in its virtues, its evils, its structure, its trends and tendencies?

You might wish to know what her own social pattern of human life is, and how it is to be constructed. You might be curious about her judgment upon contemporary religion and social [*sic*: see notes: religions of social] redemption, of which there are many.

You might even ask what are the means at the disposal of the Church, what constructive materials has she for the realization of her own particular pattern for human society? What

measure of success does she expect, anticipate, or promise, in realizing that pattern? In view of what concrete oppositions will her success necessarily be limited?

These are rather theoretical questions, aren't they? And then, descending to the more practical sphere, you might ask what the concrete social program of the Catholic Church is in the contemporary world. What is the share of the individual Catholic in the work of the transformation of human society? What is the relation of the social activity of the Church to that of the secular state, in view of their respective fields of competence? And, finally, what measure of cooperation does the Church expect, or is prepared to accept, from other religious bodies that are also vitally concerned in the construction of human society?

As you see, all these questions are very numerous, very large, and extremely complicated; and, obviously, it is quite impossible to discuss them in four lectures.

I thought, therefore, that I might perhaps be more helpful, and perhaps better further the purpose of the Institute for Religious Studies, if I dealt with things that are rather fundamental. And, hence, I think that my lectures might revolve around this central theme: to develop for you the fact that the Church does conceive herself to have a mission in the socio-temporal order, in the total field of human social life as it is lived here on this earth.

Secondly, to show you that this socio-temporal mission is intrinsically related to her supra-temporal, supra-social mission: to her conduct [*sic*: conducting] of souls to their eternal destiny in God.

And, thirdly, to attempt to show you also that her socio-temporal mission derives from her very essence; that it is not something added, as it were, but is something integrated with her very *raison d'etre*, her whole purpose in existing.

In order to approach the question properly, I think that there are certain fundamental theological positions that ought to be at least outlined, because they are quite necessary, I think, for understanding the course of my argument--not exactly "argument;" call it, rather, "exposition."

The first position is this: For the Catholic, of course, the problem of religion is not posited in purely individualistic terms. That is to say, we do not consider religion to be designed to answer simply this single question: "How am I to receive personal assurance with regard to the forgiveness of my own personal sins?"

You are doubtless aware that the Council of Trent denied that the grace of justification consisted in, or necessarily carried with it, any such infallible assurance; and asserted, moreover, that the quest of such an assurance is not the legitimate religious quest of the children of the Church. Rather, it enjoined upon the children of the Church that they live their religious lives in a state of tension between two poles: the pole of hope and the pole of fear.¹

Enlarging that topic, I would say, further, that for the Catholic the problem of religion is not reduced simply to the problem of sin, to the problem of its avoidance or of its forgiveness. This certainly would not be an adequate statement of the problem of religion: "How am I to pick

¹ Council of Trent, Session VI, Decree on Justification, chapters 9, 12, 13, and canons 12-16; DH, 1533-34, 1540-41; 1562-66.

my way through what is at best a rather dirty world, and remain unsoiled by its contagion?"² Or, put positively, how am I to obey the ten commandments?

That question, after all, is simply the question of natural morality, because the content of the ten commandments is accessible to human reason, though it has also been revealed through God, to the Hebrew people. And that problem of natural morality is put in all its imperiousness to every man, be he Christian or Jew or pagan, or anything else.

It is true that the problem of sin and its avoidance is a crucial one. In the liturgy of Christian baptism a white garment is delivered to the neophyte after his baptism, with the solemn injunction that he carry it unspotted before the judgment seat of God.

That ritual act signifies that, for the spotlessness of his own soul, each man bears a personal and ultimate and irreducible responsibility, in such wise that if he appears before the judgment seat of God without his wedding garment, or with his garment rent or torn, then he himself alone must bear eternally the consequences. In other words, at the basis of the Catholic religion there is that intense sense of personal responsibility for one's own soul.

We have never maintained, of course, that a man is automatically, as it were, saved because he is in the Church, the visible Church, any more than we have ever maintained that a man is automatically lost because he is outside the visible Church: Neither of these positions is acceptable.

Responsibility for one's own soul is a personal matter; and although, in a sense, I am assisted in bearing the responsibility for my own salvation, as I hope to point out, nevertheless that responsibility ultimately devolves upon me, and upon me alone; and it is that fact which gives to religion, of course, its underlying seriousness.

I suppose at times that responsibility would be almost intolerable if we did not realize that in bearing it we are assisted by others. At any rate, this responsibility for my own soul is not my total Christian responsibility: that is the point that I wanted to make.

You perhaps know of the book that achieved a certain amount of celebrity some thirty or more years ago, by Gabriel Séailles, called *Les Affirmations de la Conscience Moderne*. In it he drew two opposed portraits: the portrait, as he called it, of the Christian, and the portrait of the modern man.

The modern man, to him, was "he who accepts the world with its laws, all its laws, and with the resolution to force the world to yield to him every bit of good of which it is capable."

And against that portrait he drew the portrait of a Christian: "the man who retires from the city of men preoccupied solely with his own salvation, which is an affair simply between himself and God."³

² This sentence evokes the statement of Jean Giono cited by Henri de Lubac in the very first page of his book *Catholicism* and reflecting the criticism of Christianity he wished to oppose: "I will not pass through the battlefields with a rose in my hand"; *Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 13. Giono (1895-1970) was a French novelist and pacifist; the citation is from his essay "Les vraies richesses" (1936).

³ De Lubac cites these two sentences of Seailles book, published in 1903, in *Catholicism*, 14. Séailles (1852-1922) was a French philosopher.

You find him echoing, of course, the famous sneer of Renan that Christianity as a religion is made for the interior consolation of a small group of the elect.⁴

Of course, that concept is refuted by the totality of authentically Catholic Christian tradition. It is especially refuted by those who have been the highest embodiment of the Christian spirit: the Saints. I don't think I need to delay upon that point.

The essential point I want to make is this: that the grace of Christian baptism, as we conceive it, essentially involves the assumption of social responsibilities.⁵ It involves the assumption of a responsibility for the whole human race; and that responsibility extends itself not simply to the eternal salvation, as we call it, of the human race, but extends itself also to the conditions of its temporal, earthly life; in such wise that I am obliged, by the very fact of baptism, to be concerned with this world, and with the creation in this world of social conditions that will render it possible for a man to be a man.

That Catholic sense of responsibility received one of its most recent definitions by Pius XII in the radio address he gave commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the *Rerum Novarum*, the great social charter of Leo XIII.⁶

In that address, which you may have read--it was published in the *New York Times* on June 2--Pope Pius XII asserts, first of all, the Church's steady will "to share in the future organization of that new order which the world is waiting for, and which it hopes will arise from

⁴ Murray took the reference from de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 305, who cited Ernest Renan's *Marc-Aurèle*.

⁵ Murray's notes refer here to "Lubac - grace of baptism, membership in Church involves essentially assumption of a responsibility for all mankind - extends self not only to 'eternal salvation,' but to condition of temporal life." This goes a bit beyond the discussion of baptism in *Catholicism*, 35-37; perhaps there are later references.

⁶ Pius XII, Radio Message, Pentecost, June 1, 1941; *AAS*, 33 (1941) 203-204; published in *The New York Times*, 2 June 1941, p. 4. Here are the paragraphs to which Murray alludes in his remarks:

These are the principal concepts of man, beloved children, with which we should wish even now to share in the future organization of that new order which the world expects and hopes will arise from the seething ferment of the present struggle to set the peoples at rest in peace and justice.

What remains for us but, in the spirit of Leo XIII and in accordance with his advice and purpose to exhort you to continue to promote the work which the last generation of your brothers and sisters had begun with such staunch courage? Do not let die in your midst and fade away the insistent call of the social encyclical, that voice which indicates to the faithful in the supernatural regeneration of mankind the moral obligation to cooperate in the arrangement of society and especially of economic life, exhorting those who share in this life to action no less than the State itself.

Is not this a sacred duty for every Christian? Do not let the external difficulties put you off, dear children, do not be upset by the obstacle of the growing paganism of public life.[26] Do not let yourselves be misled by the manufacturers of errors and unhealthy theories, those deplorable trends not of increase but of decomposition and of corruption of the religious life; currents of thought which hold that since redemption belongs to the sphere of supernatural grace is, therefore, exclusively the work of God, there is no need for us to cooperate on earth.

the seething ferments of the present struggle, to set the peoples of the world at rest in peace and justice."

He goes on to impose anew on all Catholics "the moral obligation to cooperate in the organization of society, and especially of economic life." Note the phrase "the moral obligation." He extends not merely an invitation; he imposes a duty.

Moreover, he terms this cooperation in the reorganization of society "a sacred duty for every Christian"--a duty, namely, from whose fulfillment no difficulty is to deter them: a sacred duty. It is not, therefore, a convenient outlet for excess energy, but a duty that is sacred because it derives from the very fact of their Christian baptism.

An essential part of the efficacy of the baptismal grace, as we conceive it, is to instil in the soul of the Catholic a sense that is properly Catholic; the sense that Pius XII says "for the last two thousand years has lived and persevered in the soul of the Church: the sense of the collective responsibility of all for all."

It is to that definition of the Catholic sense that I have been coming: a sense of the collective responsibility of all for all. That sense of responsibility, you see, is twofold: a sense of responsibility first for my own soul; and then a sense of responsibility for others--not only for the souls of others, but for others--because the Church has always maintained that she exists not simply for the salvation of souls, but for the salvation of men and women, and men and women are something more than souls; they are souls incarnate in the body. And the body too has its exigencies; the body too demands salvation; or, rather, man as such, as a unit, is to be saved.

After that much introduction, let me come to what is the proper subject of today's lecture. I want, at least briefly, to indicate the genesis of this sense of collective responsibility of all for all that Pius XII points out is characteristic of the Catholic soul. To understand it, I think that there are two great Catholic truths that must be grasped.

The first of them is this: It is a fundamental position in Catholic dogma and theology that the human race is concretely one. That is the first truth: the concrete unity of the human race. It is one in nature, we maintain; and it is one, also, in Christ. It has, therefore, a two-fold unity: a natural unity that is consecrated and solidified still further by a supernatural unity.

The second great truth that must be grasped, I think if the Church's social mission and her social program are to be at all understood, is the truth of the unity of nature and grace, the unity of the human and the divine, which are two distinct principles; but, in their concrete existential reality, are one, are united.

The pattern, of course, of that unity between nature and grace, the human and the divine, we find in the incarnate Word of God, Christ Jesus, in whom there was a perfect human nature and a perfect divine nature, each of them distinct from the other, and yet united in the unity of one single person.

Apart, I say, from these two truths, the Catholic Church herself is unintelligible; and, above all, her relations to humanity and her functions in the socio-temporal order are completely unintelligible. Hence, today I should like to deal with the first of these two great truths: The concrete unity of the human race as it is conceived in the Catholic scheme of thought. Next time I shall deal with the second truth: The unity of nature and grace.

A grasp of those two truths will, I think, prepare us to grasp the peculiarly religious character of the Church's social mission, and how her social action is essentially distinct from any program of pure humanitarianism; and that subject I will treat in the third lecture. And then those first three lectures will introduce to the fourth, which will be a discussion of the Church's actual social program in our contemporary world.

And so for today's subject. Someone has said very well--a French theologian--that there is at the bottom of the Christian gospel a positive obsession with regard to the unity of the human community.⁷

That is very true; that is one of the structural truths, basically structural truths, of Catholic Christianity. We maintain that the unity of the human race is, first of all, concrete, not merely specific. It is concrete and it is all comprehensive: that all men who ever were or are or ever will be are organically united one with the other to form one vast unity.

Moreover, this unity of mankind is an ontological unity; that is to say, it exists antecedently to any intentional relationships. I mean by that any relationships that are established between man and man by thought.

It exists, secondly, antecedently to any contractual relationships; those, namely, which are called into being by acts of the human will. It is an ontological unity that is vital; that is natural, as I would call it. It is given. I did not create it; I cannot destroy it; it is there.

Each man, it is true, is an expression of a divine idea. Each man, as Dr. Bokser pointed out to you very beautifully,⁸ I thought, in one of his lectures, is absolutely unique, unduplicated in the whole of creation. He is such precisely because he is the expression of the divine idea.

Therefore, each man exists in his own concrete individuality before the mind of God, unlike others, himself supremely; and yet, all mankind stands before God as a unit.

Man before God is man with a capital "M"; and God rules the destiny of mankind inasmuch as mankind is a unity.

I might say that God's outlook on the human race is primarily social, and only then individual, except that that statement might be misunderstood. I should say, rather, perhaps, that God deals with each individual as he is; and he is a unit in a social human context. He does not exist as an isolated atom; but, between him and all humanity, there are invisible, intangible, mysterious, yet very real, bonds of solidarity.

Moreover, as mankind is one, so the history of mankind is one; that is to say, it is an organically developing process which follows a pattern which has one supreme meaning, which had one starting point, and which moves towards one goal: That is the essential Christian concept of man.

You might inquire about the origins of this unitary concept of man and his history. Its peculiar character, of course, is that it is theological. I mean that it does not derive from the data of anthropological science; nor does it derive from philosophical speculation. I think I would

⁷ De Lubac, *Catholicism*, 15, citing Eugène Masure.

⁸ Ben-Zion Bokser (1907-1984) was a graduate of Jewish Theological Seminary and for decades rabbi at Forest Hills Jewish Center in Queens, N.Y.

prefer to leave to you the question as to just how far philosophical speculation or scientific research might avail to establish the concrete unity of the human race. How far?

I was interested, in looking over one of the previous lectures, in one of the questions that was asked by someone--un-named, of course--who, in the course of the question, made the assertion that the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man had been known since the days of Aristotle.

I would say this with all kindness, but that is an extremely naive statement. Aristotle had no concept whatever of the fatherhood of God, and still less a concept of the brotherhood of man. You do find the idea in a fairly advanced state of development--the idea, I mean, of the unity of the human race; or call it universalism--in the Hebrew prophetic tradition, in the concept of the coming reign of God.

Be that all as it may, my point is simply this: That to us, as Catholics, that idea comes as a revelation. It is, therefore, an idea that is given to us, and given to us in Christ.

A compendious statement, of course, of the mystery of Christ, and of his meaning as we conceive it, is given to us by St. Paul in his Letter to the Ephesians, in the first chapter, the ninth Verse, where he says, "And this," namely the Father's, "this his good pleasure, you purposed in him to be dispensed in the fullness of time to reunite all things in Christ, both those in the heavens and those on earth."

The Greek word that St. Paul uses--*anakephalaiosasthai*--has four meanings, as you doubtless know: It means to restore or reestablish; it means to resume, that is, to sum up, gather up under a head or a heading; it means, thirdly, to crown; and it means, fourthly, to reunite.

It is this latter meaning which seems to be indicated by the context, and which is accepted by a great many exegetes: J. Armitage Robinson, d'Ales, Huby, Benoit, and dozens of others; there is no need of cataloguing names.⁹

St. Paul, therefore, asserts--and the assertion in that Letter to the Ephesians is duplicated elsewhere--that the essential work of Christ is the work of restoration, a work of reunion.

There is a patristic attitude, which is classic in Catholic theology, that Christ restored to us what Adam lost. And the point I want to make is this: That what Adam lost was unity, and what Christ gave back is unity.

We think of Him, of course, as redeemer. His office and function might be made, perhaps, more concrete by calling Him not so much redeemer as unifier. He is our unifier or, even better, He is Himself our unity.

Our view of man, therefore, and of human history, is essentially a religious, a theological view. We, in viewing mankind and his history, take our standpoint literally on Calvary, because from Calvary, from Christ, there streams back a light into the past religious history of mankind, and there streams forward also a light into the future religious history of mankind; and that light illuminates the four mysteries that constitute Christian anthropology as it is understood in the Catholic Church.

Those four mysteries are these: First, the mystery of the original unity established by God; secondly, the mystery of its shattering by sin; thirdly, the mystery of its restoration by

⁹ De Lubac, *Catholicism*, 44, refers to the same four exegetes. In these pages Murray is essentially summarizing de Lubac's thought in the first chapter of this book.

Christ; and, fourthly, the mystery of its progressive realization in the Church of Christ--which is the *Catholic Unitas*, the Catholic unity of mankind.

Basically, the Catholic Church asserts herself to be nothing else but humanity unified under its head, Christ. Let me, therefore, very briefly indicate and sketch out the content of these four truths that, as I say, constitute Christian anthropology. I do so simply in order to show you how this sense of the collective responsibility of all for all necessarily must be deeply wrought into the Catholic soul in virtue of the truths that are essential to Catholic faith.

First of all, then, all that Catholic tradition has to say about the original primitive state of man in his first historical appearance on earth--namely, about Adam and Eve--may be well summed up under the etiquette: Unity.

Man was, of course, created in the image of God. Let me point out what that phrase means in our theological tradition. It has two meanings: first of all, that Adam and Eve were created intelligent and free; able, therefore, to enter into conscious union with God and conscious union with all reality, able to give themselves by love to God and to others.

There were therefore in the image of God, who is subsistent intelligence and uncreated love. Their life, therefore, was a life like that of God. They shared with him in the two highest functions of life: intelligence and will. But they shared these functions on an essentially lower plane--on the plane, namely, of the creature. They were not God; they were only like Him.

And Augustine points out frequently--I shouldn't quote Latin, and I wouldn't do so as a matter of affectation; but I am so accustomed to lecturing in theology in Latin, and citing the Scriptures in Latin, that occasionally I slip.

Augustine says that you cannot discover a similitude, a likeness, between the creature and its creator so great that at the same time you do not discover a greater dissimilitude. The phrase is used in the Fourth Council of Lateran.¹⁰

This likeness to God is, of course, at the basis of the natural solidarity of mankind, as it is also at the basis of the natural dignity of each single individual. Because he is in the image of God, man is personalized, and he is also universalized--related to others who are like unto Him.

Catholic theology, however, distinguishes from this natural image of God a second supernatural image of God that was implanted, stamped upon the first man. God stamped upon Adam the image of His eternal son, who is His Word; the "*character tou Patros*," as Paul calls him in his Letter to the Hebrews (Hb 1:3)--the Image of the Father.

Stamped thus with this new image, Adam was not simply God's creature, but God's son; and son not in any purely metaphorical sense as, for instance, in the Old Testament, Israel is spoken of as the Son of God in virtue of the alliance between God and the people of Israel. Adam was a Son of God in a sense that was wholly real, although wholly mysterious.

He was the Son of God because to him there had been communicated a share in God's own life. He had been, therefore, really divinized. There had been put in him a new capacity for God. His natural capacity for God, in virtue of which he is called the Image of God, had entitled

¹⁰ "Between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without acknowledging a greater dissimilitude"; Lateran IV, ch. II, DH 806. Perhaps Murray is thinking of Augustine's statement, near the end of his *De Trinitate*, 15, 21, that "in this mirror, in this puzzle, in this likeness, who can explain how great the unlikeness is?"

him simply to a knowledge and a love of God that would be obtained through creation, through creatures, above all through an intuition of his own soul.

This new capacity for God enabled him to view God as he is in himself; enabled him to look, therefore, ultimately, in heaven, upon the face of the Father, and see it as the face of the Father, see it as the eternal Son sees it. He was, therefore, as Paul calls him, a co-heir of Christ (Rm 8:17), his heritage the same as that of the Eternal Word, which is, of course, the vision of the Father face to face.

Hence, consecrating, ennobling, elevating the natural dignity of man there came a new dignity. He was not only a creature of God; he was a child, a son of God; and this new image of God that was put into Adam created a new solidarity between men.

They all shared; they shared now in the one divine life, and they were one with each other after the fashion in which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one: A oneness of life; a life, of course, that, in the creature, is not uncreated, but is merely shared, participated.

That, therefore, was the first great unity that God established between himself and Adam, who was the first-born of all creatures. That union with God perfected the nature, the human nature, of Adam and Eve; gave them, we hold, the gift of integrity, the gift of a wholeness; brought passion and instinct under the control of reason, in such wise that in Adam there was not that tragic inner conflict that divides us, and that has been so pointedly described by Paul in the seventh chapter of his Letter to the Romans.

There was, furthermore, no refractory egocentrism that with us creates division between man and man. The social life of the first human community was perfect, marred by no rift.

The third great unity established in that primitive state of man was between man and the material world, of which he was Lord, in such wise that natural forces did not exert upon him destructive effect. He was allied with them; they worked with him; and his unity with the material world, of course, resulted in a relatively perfect knowledge of the material world, and a perfectible knowledge, of course.

We hold further that this newer image of God was stamped not simply upon Adam, but, rather, upon human nature in Adam. Adam was more than an individual; he was the head of humanity in whom, as in their common progenitor, all men were. Therefore, this new image of God, this sonship of God, was to be transmitted to the concrete, finite, numbered multitude of human acts [*sic*: see notes: family?] that constitute, in the mind of God, the human race.

I am rather an admirer of St. Thomas and Aristotelian Thomism, and a dear friend of mine used to point out, in arguing against me, that God is not an Aristotelian; God is rather a Platonist; that is to say, he does not think in Aristotelian abstractions, but thinks rather in Platonic wholes, concrete wholes. This other man was much more sympathetic with the philosophy of Plato, and with its Christian reproduction in the Augustinian tradition.

Therefore, Adam was something more, I say, than a single individual; he was the head of humanity, and responsible for its future. All men were in him; and in him, as St. Paul says, all men died.

That introduces us to the second great Christian mystery that integrates our Christian anthropology: The mystery, namely, of the shattering of mankind's original unity by the sin of Adam. That sin, of course, did not corrupt humanity as such. After his sin Adam remained

human; we who are born of Adam are still human; we are still capable of knowledge of God and love of God. We are still, therefore, the image of God. We retain that natural image of God of which I spoke.

But the sin of Adam did deface the supernatural image that was in man, destroyed his capacity for that higher knowledge and love of God, forfeited the privilege of God's sonship. So that Adam remained united to God, it is true, by the bond that unites creature to creator; but the bond that united him to God as child to father was severed. The divine energies imparted to his soul were withdrawn, the divine life died out, and mankind literally fell apart; because, just as all that we have to say about the original state of man can be summed up under the idea of unity, so also all that we have to say about what is called original sin can be summed up under the etiquette of disunity, discord, scattering.

As a result of original sin we maintain that man is born in a state of discord: A discord, first, that obtains within the human personality--man is split off from himself; man is absent from himself; man is at war with himself--a discord, secondly, that obtains in his social life.

Man has been individualized in the worst sense of that word;¹¹ that is to say, he has been erected into an egocentric unity who only very painfully achieves that outgoing quality of life which even psychologists point out as essential to mental health and to social harmony.

Man finds himself, thirdly, in a state of discord with the material world. Natural forces are destructive, operate against him and against his works.

In this state of scatteredness--let me call it that--each man is born; and that is the state that we characterize as the state of original sin. Original sin to us is not an act, but a state. It is a privation, not a positive thing; not, as it were, some festering ulcer within human nature, but the absence of that integrity, of that unity, which God established in the primitive creation of man.

Original sin, to us, does not entail any dehumanization of man, but it does imply a real deterioration in man from what he was originally.

We hold, of course, that Adam fell off a tower to the earth; he did not fall from the surface off the earth into a well. He retained all that a human nature, as such, could demand. He was, therefore, still a man, but he was no longer a son of God.

Against this background of the original unity as shattered by sin Catholic theology projects the theology of the redemption by Christ: by his incarnation, his passion, and his death.

Perhaps the simplest formula that sums up the whole work of Christ, as we conceive it, is that which is given by St. John in the eleventh chapter, the fifty-second verse, where he says that Christ was to die not only for the people, but that he might gather into one the scattered children of God.¹² His essential mission was to reunite scattered mankind, to restore it to the primitive unity that God had given it when it first historically appeared upon earth.

Just as it is characteristic of Adam in the Catholic tradition to be not simply an individual, but the head of the human race; so also we look upon Christ as the head, the new head, of the human race--the second Adam, as Paul calls him.

Cyril of Alexandria, of course, has been the classic exponent of this aspect of the incarnation: The idea that in Christ all men were, just as in Adam all men were. He speaks of the

¹¹ See de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 33.

¹² Cited by de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 41.

incarnation as not simply a *corporatio*, the embodiment of the Word of God, but as a *concorporatio*, which we would have to translate as a con-embodiment: That God descended into the human race and united with himself not simply a human nature, but united human nature.¹³

Cyril of Alexandria says, for instance: "It is not in vain that John asserts that the Word has come to dwell among us. Thereby he gives us to understand the profound mystery that all of us are in Christ, and that the common person of humanity is restored to life by his entrance into it."¹⁴

That was his work, therefore: To gather into one, to reunite, the scattered children of God. That was, of course, his supreme aspiration as he voiced it in his high priestly prayer after the Last Supper, related in the Seventeenth Chapter of St. John.

He had one supreme desire that expressed for him the total meaning of his life and death: *ut sint unum*--that they may be one; and you find other expressions of the same thing throughout the New Testament.

Such, therefore, are, very briefly expressed, the four major truths of Christian anthropology: The community of man in nature and his solidarity in nature, his solidarity in grace, his solidarity in guilt, his solidarity in restoration.

I sketch through these doctrines not, obviously, that I ask you to accept them. They may seem to you completely naive or entirely fantastic. My point, however, is simply this: To one who holds those doctrines as true, naturally the result would be the genesis in his soul of an intense sense of the collective responsibility of all for all. No one who holds those four truths could possibly regard himself as simply an isolated individual; nor could he regard any man as isolated from the fate of humanity as such, because humanity, in his mind would exist as it exists in the mind of God, as a concrete unity; and hence he would see himself in the total fate of humanity as such.

It is these four truths that are at the very basis of the whole Catholic concept of the social mission of the Church and the social program of the Church. Behind, you see, therefore, this collective responsibility of all for all, and giving it operative effect, you have all the compelling urgency of a religious motive; and you have, moreover, the fact, which is constantly present to us, of course, that it is precisely upon our faithful discharge of our social responsibilities that we will ultimately be judged.

We maintain, of course, that the whole historical process will culminate in a general judgment. The whole purpose of that general judgment is in order that to the eyes of each one of us there may be displayed mankind as it is, as a unit; and that we may see what we do not see now: the history of man also as a unitary process. We shall see the part that each one of us has played in it for good or ill.

That, therefore, brings to a close the remarks I wanted to make this morning, which have extended themselves five minutes beyond the time that I had allotted myself. Their whole purpose, therefore, has been simply to show you, or to attempt, at any rate, to show you, the

¹³ Cited by de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 37; who, however, ascribes the idea of *concorporatio* to Hilary, not to Cyril of Alexandria.

¹⁴ The quotation is drawn from de Lubac, *Catholicism*, 39-40.

generative forces existent in the Catholic soul that cause to rise in it that collective sense of the collective responsibility of all for all.

There are doubtless some of you who wish to ask questions. By all means, feel entirely free to do so.

QUESTION: Are there any Catholic theologians or scientists who believe in polygenesis, as against monogenesis?

FATHER MURRAY: You mean, therefore, that the doctrine of the reincarnation...

SAME QUESTIONER: No, not reincorporation, but the genesis; that the human race sprang from different ancestors instead of from one single pair of ancestors: That is polygenesis.

FATHER MURRAY: No there is no...

SAME QUESTIONER: There are not many anthropologists anywhere who hold it, but there are some who have held it, simultaneously or...

FATHER MURRAY: There is no Catholic theologian who holds it, or who could hold it.

SAME QUESTIONER: They couldn't hold it?

FATHER MURRAY: Because it is for us an article of faith that the whole human race has been descended from one single pair: Adam and Eve.

QUESTION: I listen to Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen very often on Sunday evenings; and last Sunday evening he mentioned the fact that it isn't beyond our imagination or hope that the Holy Father might descend as a dove, tracing back the origin of his name and its meaning, and the light, into the very battles of the world today, and provide a possibility for peace in an unexpected way and at an unexpected time. Is there anything in the Catholic Church to indicate that there might be such a possibility?

FATHER MURRAY: I don't think so, no. You doubtless have heard the same story that was told a propos of the last war: How some white-robed figure, on the morning of Armistice Day, was supposed to have appeared in no man's land, and spread out his arms in a gesture of benediction, and was supposed to have been the Holy Father.

However, that is just a pious story in which I personally would take no particular stock; nor do I see any concrete grounds for expecting any such miraculous intervention.

I am afraid that the work of achieving peace--and I am sure that the Holy Father himself regards it as such--will be a long work of most intense labor, where every single human energy will have to be deployed and exploited to the utmost; and that we cannot legitimately hope for supernatural interventions.

That, therefore, seems to conclude. Thank you.

LECTURE II - FEBRUARY 17, 1942

I thought, after last week's lecture, that I really made great demands upon your interest and sympathy, but I don't exactly apologize for this reason: that I rather expect that you would expect me to do that. Coming in contact with a group such as this of people whose concerns are deeply religious, whose thought is profound, I rather felt that I would please you better by dealing, as I said, with fundamentals even though fundamentals are always difficult, undoubtedly.

Let me this morning briefly recapitulate the points that we made last time. I simply wanted to outline the fundamental position from which all Catholic thought on the problem of religion and society begins, and that position is the Catholic "sense of the collective responsibility of all for all." The phrase, you remember, is that of Pius XII, and it could be duplicated by Under-douglas [*sic!* untold dozens?] in the various utterances of Catholic tradition.

I tried to indicate the genesis of that sense--how it takes its rise out of the whole Catholic concept of religion. We conceive religion, as I said, not simply as a means of personal comfort in a world that is a world of suffering and of evil, nor simply a solution to the problem of personal sin either--its avoidance or its forgiveness--nor do we conceive religion as simply a means of "saving men's souls", as we call it--saving men's souls from this world. We maintain, of course, that religion is a highly personal thing; that each soul, in its uniqueness--which uniqueness is at once the privilege and the tragedy--is uniquely related to the Most High God.

You know Augustine's phrase: that "God is deeper than my deepest self, more inward than my most inward self."¹ Each soul, we maintain, must find itself in God uniquely, or else it will lose itself, and lose itself forever. But, although religion is highly personal, it is also essentially social.

Now of course, I am not concerned with the essentially social character of Catholicism, inasmuch as the Catholic religion is incarnate in a visible, organized church, a true society, a social unity whose interior principle (soul) is the Holy Spirit of God and whose body is hierarchically organized; nor am I concerned with other aspects of the social character of Catholicism--for instance, our position that revelation is socially mediated in terms of a social anthropology and is not solely communicated in terms of an interior light. Those subjects lie outside our present field. I was concerned essentially with the aspect as it is revealed in the fundamental tenet of Catholic faith. I wanted to show how the whole content of Catholic faith is designed to impress on the Catholic a social sense. It is designed to stimulate him to think in social terms, it tends to generate in his soul a deep sense of social responsibility, tends to make him realize his "sacred duty", as Pius XII calls it, "to humanity," to human society as such.

Now that fundamental tenet of Catholic faith is the belief of the Church in the concrete unity of the whole human race. We believe that Christ, who is the author and perfecter of our faith, brought this idea into the world as a new thing. It had, as I suggested, been glimpsed as from afar by the Hebrew prophets. Pagan philosophy had groped after it, but the idea itself came into the clear vision of man only through Christ. In Him--in what He was in what He did--we

¹ Augustine, *Confessions*, III, 6.11): *interior intimo meo et superior summo meo.*

were given a revelation of the inner depth [*sic*, see notes: intimate?] mysterious bond of solidarity in which the Eternal Father has chosen to unite all men of all times.

We believe that Christ, being God, had the mind of God. We believe that He saw man as God sees man--and God sees man, as I suggested, as if were spelled with a capital "M". God sees Man as a unity--a social whole--one vast integrated social whole.

I emphasized, I think, the point that our faith in the unity of humankind--a unity which is sustained amid all the bewildering diversities that we find between individual and individual--is an essential part of our faith in Christ. Now I said that that point was important in order that the true character of our intuition into Man's unity might be grasped. It is to us an essentially theological and religious idea. We do not arrive at it simply through an exploration of our hearts wherein we find a natural affinity for all men--a certain natural sympathy for all men. It is not arrived at either by study of the world, in all fields of human life, economic, cultural, and all the rest.

You might ask the question: How far might such a study of the world or of the individual heart avail to convince a man of the concrete unity of the whole human race? and how such a study would transcend the difficulties of his cause [*sic*] by the fact that we are intimately conscious rather more, I think, of how we differ from other people than of how we are one with them? At any rate, for us the idea came from God through Christ, and our acceptance of it is motivated by the authority of God revealing. We maintain that it is a true idea because it is God's idea, an idea that He gave me--an idea, therefore, that is not subject to question on my part nor subject to revision. I accepted it and go on from there to live it as best I may. It is that religious and theological character of this idea that gives it its power as a motive force in life, does not leave it at the mercy of experience, which, as I said, is so often seemingly contrary to it.

I touched upon the question as to how this idea does actually derive from our faith in Christ. I suggested that the answer is to be found in two verses of Sacred Scripture--two verses in which there is contained really, at least in germ, the whole Catholic idea of man and his history. The first is in Paul's Letter to the Ephesians, in the first chapter, where he says: "The mystery of God's will, the mystery of his gratuitous love to all men, is this: that in the fullness of time He sent His Son, born of a woman, in order that through Him he might reestablish and restore all things, both the things in Heaven and on earth." The second was in the Gospel of St. John, the 11th chapter, where John says that "Christ died in order that He might gather into one the scattered children of God."

I developed the idea of the concrete unity of the human race as it is conceived of in Catholicism in four steps. The first step is the mystery of God's original creative love of Man--how human society, as it came from the hand of God, was perfectly and supremely a unity. God breathed into the first human pair, Adam and Eve, His own spirit in order to make them one--one with himself, one with each other, one with their own personalities, and one with the material world. He gave, moreover, that gift of the Holy Spirit to Adam, as to the head of the human race. That gift was to endure in humanity, in the mind of God, since it was one with solidarity in its destiny.

But the perdurance of that unity of human society was conditioned by Man's free will to be obedient to the truth about himself and to God. Adam, as we know, was disobedient; he

sinned, and by his sin he drove out that Holy Spirit of unity. The effect was, I said, a scattering of human nature both in its social and religious life. Human nature fell apart into disunity, and that is the history of what we call original sin. Adam sinned as head of humanity, and hence the effect of his sin was transmitted to all his posterity, to every member of the human race, of which he was the head.

You see, the fact of the transmission of original sin in the Catholic concept was based wholly on the sin of Adam. The law of redemption is based upon the same law of human solidarity. We believe that what Man had shattered, God [*sic!*, see notes!] could not remake. It is not in the power of man to summon God from heaven; if he comes, he comes freely of his own will. We believe he did descend in Christ, who was the sole [*sic*, see notes] head of humanity. Christ, in the world of God made flesh [*sic*: the Word of God made flesh?], came to effect the reunion of Man (with a capital "M"), with [*sic*] all men, of that social unity which is Mankind. He was to effect that unity of God and Man, of Man and Man, of Man with himself, and--to a degree at any rate--of Man with the material world. He was the second Adam who came to repair the work of the first. By assuming a human nature, Christ assumed Human Nature (again spelled with capitals). As head of humanity, he was responsible for all men, for all who share Human Nature.

I said, I think, it is a common patristic adage that every man was in Christ and, in virtue of that solidarity, Christ's atoning sacrifice was the atoning sacrifice of all men. It was not merely that He atoned for all men; we should better say that in Him all men atoned, because only thus could the effects of His atonement pass to all men. If He had stood, as it were, outside of human nature and of the human race, the effect of His atonement could have been transmitted to us only by a resurrection of some sort. As a matter of fact, He stood at the very interior of humanity, and that supreme act of obedience and love that he offered to God through the sacrifice of the cross, that act rose through humanity as such, somehow mysteriously rose through my heart and yours, and consequently that act merited by [*sic*, see notes: for?] Christ himself, [*it?*] merited for all men who in Him had made that act. We believe that for Christ the act of His sacrifice merited his resurrection from the dead--merited namely a reunion of His body and His soul; and for all mankind it merited literally the same thing: a resurrection from the dead, a reunion of that vast body which is Humanity with its soul, which is the Holy Spirit of God, that Holy Spirit which you will remember had withdrawn from Humanity as a consequence of the sin of Adam. You see, therefore, that the law of human solidarity is again operative and apart from that law of human solidarity the mystery of redemption remains to us unintelligible. Man remains as a solidary whole. "All men rose," as St. Paul said, "from the dead, in Christ."²

Now the reality of that resurrection of mankind into a life of unity was dramatized at Pentecost, at the time of the visible descent of the Holy Spirit upon the early church. The effect of that descent, you remember, was precisely to solidify the still very fragile unity of those twelve chosen hierarchs, the apostles, and of those who had congregated with them. The first part of the Acts of the Apostles, as you know, portrays the unity of the Church: its unity of faith, how all its members were of one mind; its unity of love, how all its members were of one heart;

² Col2:12-13; I Cor 15:22? Citations uncertain.

its unity of ritual and worship, how all its members were one in prayer and in the breaking of the bread; and, fourthly, its unity of obedience to one authority: Peter.

The second part of the Acts of the Apostles portrays the unity of the Church in the act of becoming Catholic, transcending all barriers of race and of culture. The second part of the Acts shows actually, historically, the gathering into one of the children of God and their rescue from all their particularisms. It isn't, in other words, simply the Acts of the Apostles, but a historical commentary on the basic truth that sums up the whole meaning of Christ for us; and that is the theme of all Paul's teaching, and it is contained in third chapter of the Galatians, the twenty-third verse: "In Him is neither Jew nor Greek nor slave nor free, neither male nor female, for ye are all one person in Christ Jesus." According to the meaning of that phrase, in Christ Jesus, in Paul, you are namely one person in the body of Christ, which is the Church. The Greek of that text is interesting because he uses the masculine nominative: "You are all one person", not one "thing", simply.

Now my point, simply, in all that was to show you how the idea of human solidarity was deeply implanted in all Catholic doctrine and to illustrate how it generates the corresponding attitude--namely, an identification with all humanity, a sense of concern for all humanity, a sense of responsibility for all humanity.

A GENTLEMAN: As a good Catholic, are you allowed to believe in evolution? Men like Williams say that you can.³ I know some of your authorities say you can't. It would seem to me you think one must not do that.

FATHER MURRAY: First of all, I am glad you asked that. I meant to say before I started that I would be glad if you did interrupt and ask questions. I have had a good deal of classroom experience and wouldn't mind it a bit.

The question, as you put it, is a bit too broad. Perhaps I could give a brief answer to the question in terms of a remark made by one of my colleagues. He said, "The only thing about evolution is that you can't prove it"; meaning, of course, evolution is a theory that leaves intact certain fundamental positions. For instance, we could not and would not accept the theory that would assert the human soul to be the product simply of material forces or of the material process of one sort or another. We maintain, of course, the direct and immediate creation of every single human soul--the first human soul, of course, as well as every other human soul--by God himself.

Now, with that basic position of what we call "vitalism" maintained, then the rest really is a matter of science, of anthropology; and, as I said, the only difficulty is that it cannot be proved. In itself to me, at any rate, and I think to most Catholic thinkers (I shouldn't call myself a thinker), the theory itself is highly attractive, extremely beautiful; a great illustration, for instance of the power and the wisdom of God: how from one the million, as it were, should flower out. The trouble is with the facts, and as yet, in the

³ This may refer to Michael Williams, editor of *The Commonweal*, who attended and reported upon the Scopes trial; see "Dayton, Tennessee," in his *Catholicism and the Modern Mind* (New York: Dial Press, 1928) 171-94.

present status of science, I don't believe that they are really at hand. Therefore, our position is quite simple. The fundamental position we maintain as philosophically and theologically necessary, deriving therefore from sources of proof that cannot be infringed in any way by scientific data, because they belong to an order of science that is higher than the order of natural science. Philosophy and theology rank, in the hierarchy of science, higher than mere natural science, and consequently have the right to control, in view of their own principles, the data and the conclusions of natural science.

To us the scientist has the duty of accepting direction and instruction from the philosopher in fields only, of course, in which the philosopher or the theologian is properly competent. It is not my position to tell the scientist how to interpret the various fossils or what not; but I can ask a philosopher and theologian--tell him certain philosophical and theological truths that rest on science.

A GENTLEMAN: Don't they conflict?

FATHER MURRAY: I don't think they do.

FIRST GENTLEMAN: But you must hold to the antiquity of it. Thus man, at any rate, goes 'way, 'way back. He does go far back because he was found in ancient strata.

FATHER MURRAY: No, we would accept without any difficulty at all the recognized findings of anthropology and would maintain that they do not, at any rate, conflict with the knowledge that we have from other sources.

It is true--as in many such questions where there seems to be a conflict between truth and truth--the ultimate resolution of the conflict is not accessible to us. That is to say, How am I positively to reconcile the chronological data as contained in the Old Testament with the findings, let us say, of archeology? It is very difficult to say, because, as you know, in that particular question I have several problems. You are dealing, of course, in a sense, with two unknowns. What are the chronological data of the Old Testament? What are the archeological certainties that have been established already with regard to human chronology. First in the facts that you start to reconcile and, secondly, in the actual reconciliation; but we do not find, in Catholic theology, any difficulty in accepting any actual findings of the archeologist. It is commonly admitted now, let's say, that the early theologians--to whom, of course, scientific data were not available and for which, of course, they cannot be blamed--made the human race altogether too young, undoubtedly: 6,000 years, or something like that--9,000 years some have stretched it to. Now we are certain that man goes away back beyond that; I think 35,000 is a very conservative estimate. The Sunday supplements, of course, go away up into the billions, but they perhaps could be accepted, I think legitimately, with a certain grain of salt.

Well, shall we resume? If there are any further questions, by all means come in with them. There is no formality about this.

Today I wanted to indicate a second contribution that Catholic religious thought makes to the problem of religion and society. It is, again, a rather theoretical contribution, namely, a contribution of an idea. Later I hope to get on to the more practical contributions that are made by the Church, but these ideas are fearfully important, and one of the phenomena of modern times perhaps is the fact that we are beginning to realize how fearfully important ideas are.

This idea is one I mentioned last time; I called it "the idea of the unity of nature and grace." Now that, of course, is only a formula that needs explanation. The idea itself, of course, is many-sided, and permeates the whole structure of Catholic dogma.

I might put it this way: we hold that, in the achievement of the salvation of mankind, the total salvation, both human and divine energies mingle such wise that the total and adequate principle of human salvation is neither the divine alone nor the human alone but the divine in unity with the human. Perhaps I could best explain the idea by beginning with the person of Christ as he is conceived in Catholic thought and faith.

To us, Christ is God, Christ is Man, and Christ is One. The whole of Catholic Christological adoration [*sic*: dogma?, doctrine?] can be summed up thus: it was summed up, defined, as doubtless you know, by the two great Councils of Ephesus in the year 431 and the Council of Chalcedon in the year 451. Ephesus defined the unity of the person of Christ. I don't, of course, go into our thought on the scriptural foundations of the dogma. No. I merely want to describe, develop the sheer fact of it. We maintain, therefore, that in Christ, human nature was united to the person of the Word, that the human nature remained human and in fact became more perfectly human in virtue of that view [*sic*: union?]. And that is precisely what we mean in Catholic theology when we speak of "grace". Grace to us is the real union of the divine and the human into one. Grace is that which lifts the human above itself, which imparts to it a divine quality, and yet at the same time that it makes it divine, it makes it entirely human and perfects it as human.

Grace, of course, is portrayed in its fullest essence in Christ in the Incarnation. That was God's communication of himself to humanity, the mingling into one of human and divine, while, at the same time, both human and divine remained distinct.

Now that Christological dogma has its repercussions throughout the whole field of Catholic literature, Catholic prayer--the whole concept of religion in the Catholic sense. I merely wanted to point out several affirmations that we make in the life [*sic* light?] of our history [*sic*!, Christology?], affirmations that relate to the problem of religion and society with which we are dealing.

First of all, we see in the fact of the Incarnation God's affirmation of the validity of all things human. He assumed a human nature--a real human nature--and by that assumption all human nature was ennobled. Consequent upon the fact of the Incarnation, we are obliged as a sacred duty to have a respect for all things human: for human intelligence, the human will, human sense, life, even for the animal part of our organism, because that as part of human nature belongs to its integrity and was ennobled by the fact of the Incarnation. We can have no contempt for matter as such. Our whole theory is based not only on the fact of man's creation in the image of God, but we see an affirmation of the fact that God's will is that man be human, as

he is supposed to be. The glory of God is a living man;⁴ it is in man that God's glory becomes concretized, so to speak.

We see, secondly, in the Incarnation, human cooperation in the work of salvation. Conceivably, God might have chosen other ways whereby to save the world. Historically, he chose one by himself becoming man, and that is an idea that runs all through patristic tradition. Once, historically, God clothed himself with man for the salvation of man, and continually throughout history he clothes himself with the human in order to save the human. In the light, therefore, of the Incarnation, we must assert that all human energies are to be enlisted in the work of man's total salvation. Therefore, the problem of society and religion demands for its solution not simply the thought of theologians but the thought of economists, politicians--shall I call them "statesmen"?--of industrialists, of government. All human forces are valid and have their place and are necessary and must cooperate toward the solution of this tremendous human problem.

You can see, therefore, why Pius XII in that radio-broadcast I quoted before, condemns the theory of false supernaturalism, the idea that redemption and salvation of the world is God's work alone and that he will do it in some apocalyptic, catastrophic fashion. In the light of the theology of the Incarnation, I might say that even prayer itself is not sufficient for the salvation of the world. It has its place, it is necessary, but its function must partly, at any rate, be to render action fecund. There must be action and cooperation.

However, although we see in the theology of the Incarnation an affirmation of the necessity of human cooperation in the work of salvation, we see in it also an affirmation of the radical insufficiency of purely human effort in saving man. Remember, it was not, we believe, an isolated human nature that redeemed the world, but a human nature that was united to the Word of God; and you find, therefore, in the theology of the Incarnation, a condemnation of sheer naturalism--the theory that maintains that man has within himself all the energies necessary in order to achieve perfect humanity both in the personal order and in the social order.

In the magazine of which I happen to be editor, *Theological Studies*, there was an article in February in which St. Thomas' thought on that subject was set forth:⁵ the idea of the necessity of grace in order that a man may be simply a man in his own individual, personal, moral life. We maintain that human nature, left to itself, is not adequate for the integral observance of the moral law; it cannot, therefore, even be properly human without a higher help.

In the light, therefore, of this consequence of the Incarnation, we have to hold that the redemption of society cannot be the work of sheer technicians. However necessary the cooperation of economists and statesmen is, it is not by such means alone that man will be saved in this world--and by "saved" I mean achieve that unity which is his birthright and which God has destined him for. Man alone cannot be the artificer of his own unity, either, in his own personal life. You remember that famous second chapter of Paul's Letter to the Romans in which he develops that idea. Nor can man be the artificer of his own unity in the social sphere. It is our belief, of course, that Christ transcended even the heroic or common perfection that can be found

⁴ St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*,

⁵ This refers to the third of Lonergan's articles on *gratia operans*.

in men, and he was perfectly a man because of the Reincarnated grace that his human man graded with the unity of God [*sic!* see notes: "uncreated grace of union"].

The fourth affirmation we have in the theology of the Incarnation is the supreme one, namely, the affirmation of the necessity of both the human and the divine operating as one, as the adequate principle of man's salvation. It was the one Christ by whom we were received and redeemed, who was both God and man and one. The phrase of Leo the Great, of course, is classic in Catholic theology: that in Christ each nature in communion with the other did what was proper to it; his actions were perfectly human; his actions were perfectly divine; but there was one personal principle behind all those actions, dignifying them all.⁶ You see, therefore, how Catholic doctrine follows a medial way between a false supernaturalism and an equally false naturalism. We maintain that man is called to be human--totally human--in his personal life and in his social life. We maintain, however, also, that he will never be human unless he is divinized by the grace of God, and by "the grace of God" I mean the descent into the soul of divine energies.

Now how that principle works out in detail I shall have to leave 'til later. Let me just conclude this morning with one further point, again a rather theoretical point, and with it we shall have laid, I think, our theoretical foundations for a more practical discussion of our problem.

The point I want now to make is this: that we, as Catholics, see the divine and the human operating in history. We share, of course, that great religious intuition which is, I understand, essential to Judaism--the idea, namely, that God is not only the master of conscience but is the master of human history; an ideal that is so splendidly set forth in the Old Testament. The humanization of man, the redemption of man, the salvation of man--I use these terms synonymously--is an historical process, and for an historical process time is needed.

There is an old axiom that "Nature makes no leaps." The maxim is true also with regard to the divine action: God doesn't go by leaps and bounds. The economy of salvation is an historical economy; it is subject, therefore, to the law of all history, which is the law of growth, and that historical process of man's unification is actually going on. That is a profound conviction of mine and a profound conviction, I know, of every Catholic in spite of all deviations caused by human error, in spite of all resistances that are opposed to the march of this great plan of God by matter and especially by the free human will. Nevertheless, this process is actually going on. We echo the great phrase of Origen: we believe that "the goodness of God is leading back the whole creation to Himself."⁷ We believe that "the leaven has been put in the mass and is actually at its work of leavening the dough. [check notes]

As we look around us today we might wonder about the truth of that, and yet I think even a survey of the world today will convince us that the historical process of man's unification is actually going on. I suppose if one were to presume to inquire into the reasons why God permits the present war--total war--one might legitimately find this; this one, at any rate, seems to me to be accessible to us. Whatever reasons he may have are too mysterious. We see all mankind today throughout the world united in a solidarity of suffering. You perhaps know that little book, *This*

⁶ This seems to refer to Leo I, *Tomus ad Flavianum*, DH 290-295.

⁷ This may quote Origen's *De principiis*, Bk. I, ch. 6, 2.

Burning Heat, by Frank Sheed's wife, whose name was Ward.⁸ In it there is quoted a letter from an Englishwoman a propos of their feelings with regard to the whole business over there, and she said that the common sentiment that imbued them all was: "We are all in this, all together." That phrase was echoed by our own President, as you remember, in his first radio broadcast after the declaration of war: "We are all in this together."⁹ Mankind is united, really, today in suffering; and I think it should be the subject of the common prayers of us all that this suffering might produce what I am convinced myself is to be its providential effect: that through mankind's experience of solidarity in suffering, mankind may come to a realization of its own unity, of that great Christian truth of which I have been speaking.

Moreover, in another sense, I think, the whole process of man's spiritual unification is actually going on in the world today.¹⁰ There is no question in anybody's mind now that the world is an economic unity and that dislocations, for instance, in the national economy of one nation cannot be confined, in effect, to that one nation alone--that they are felt all over the world.

Now that economic unity is of course basically only a material unity, yet I believe that material unity is itself a preparation for the great spiritual unity toward which mankind cannot help but aspire. We know, do we not?, that it requires a process of time and of material organization before the body of the child develops to such an extent that the free use of intelligence is possible. The body has to be organized before the spirit can use it as an instrument for its own purposes. And I wonder if you would agree with this, that what is happening today now is that a great material body--one body--is being prepared. I wonder if you will agree that what we must look forward to is the descent into that body of a soul.

Perhaps that is the significance of the tremendous material progress that has been made in the world during the last one hundred and fifty years. It is a preparation of the body of humanity for a soul, and it is, I suppose, our common aspiration that our [*sic*, a?] soul should descend, and that mankind, which is materially, economically one now, may be spiritually one. It is, at any rate, to that that I look forward and want to look forward and feel that I can look forward to with confidence. I say "look forward" because I suppose, ultimately, the Catholic attitude on the whole historical process can be summed up or rather derived from the remark of the angel that appeared to the Apostles on the Mount of the Ascension. They were standing there, looking up into Heaven, you remember, and the angel said to them: "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye looking up into Heaven?" (Acts 1:11) (I also would like to point out there are two gestures or attitudes condemned in Scripture. One is looking back, and the other is looking up into the air. You remember the verse: "He who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is not worthy of the Kingdom of Heaven." [Lk 9:62]) The Apostles were rebuked for looking up.

The Christian gaze looks forward over the whole earth where it believes, I say, this great historical process of man's spiritual and material unification is going on and that behind that gaze is confidence that this whole process tends toward one glorious determination that this God has designed men for unity. Somehow he will achieve it.

⁸ Explain who Frank and Maisie were. *This Burning Heat* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1941) was a collection of letters from England in which Catholics tried to find some meaning in World War II.

⁹ Radio broadcast, December 9, 1941. <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/120941.html>

¹⁰ Perhaps a footnote on Teilhard's essay, referred to in his earlier Loyola lectures.

Thank you. Now, are there any questions?

A LADY: What you say is all very interesting and very beautiful, but I don't see how Christian unity is going to coordinate all the forces who believe in other forms of religion--millions of Mohammedans and millions of other types of people. How are you going to bring them together?

FATHER MURRAY: Frankly, neither do I just at the moment, in this sense: I don't see how an actual spiritual unity of mankind is a likelihood in the immediate future. That is certainly true. Moreover, I don't, of course, maintain that the spiritual unity that we maintain as God's destiny for man is to be what I might call absolute, what I might call quantitative; because, you see, the subject is a bit difficult to discuss.

We maintain, of course, that there is one truth and that it is in terms of a common acceptance of that one truth that the spiritual unification of mankind is to be achieved. On the other hand, the acceptance of that one truth is not something that is forced or compelled. Truth is offered; truth has to be found; and actually truth is not acknowledged as such commonly by all. Hence we have to always admit that the unity of mankind will never be quantitatively perfect--that is to say, all-embracing in all mankind. There will always be, in other words, divisions.

The success of God's plan, so to speak, as we conceive it, will always be simply relative, precisely because, as I indicated indirectly this morning, it does not work out in automatic fashion. It is accomplished through the cooperation of the human, and it is possible, of course, always for the human to fail.

A GENTLEMAN: Would it be possible for this unity to be effected religiously and yet not Christian?

FATHER MURRAY: I should not, of course, myself be prepared to admit that, naturally, you will understand, because, of course, my convictions and my faith are that it is the Christian truth that is all-embracing and that is the one truth. It is upon that position that I personally stand, of course, as a member of the Church.

A LADY: But you don't deny that, of course, other people may find the goal through another path.

FATHER MURRAY: I perhaps would prefer to--well, I could answer simply, Yes. If I were stating that myself, I would use perhaps a different formula, because I should not admit that there is more than one way to God. There again we are on a rather difficult subject that it is difficult to discuss without wounding, and I wouldn't for the world, of course, do that. I merely have to express my own convictions, and that is what you would expect me to do.

When we say, for instance, that Christian truth is the one truth, that statement does not carry with it a denial that truth also is elsewhere to be found. No Catholic would maintain that position. The so-called "exclusivism" of the Catholic Church, as we conceive it, is based upon its inclusivism: that there is, of course, truth elsewhere, but that truth in its integrity is here. Such, frankly stated, is our position, and that leaves, of course, completely untouched the whole problem of God's ways with individual souls, because you see our Catholic position is always predicated upon the idea which I tried to develop: namely, that God's plan for mankind is conceived of in social terms; that God designs one way for all men; that one way, we maintain, He has revealed in Christ. He has not, however, chosen to reveal to us how He deals with individuals; that we do not know, ultimately. His dealings with the individual human soul are secrets that are not accessible to any man, because He Himself has not chosen to speak of it. He has told us how His Fatherly providence watches over His children; but He has never told me us how He deals with them.

There is an old scholastic maxim that "every individual is ineffable"; we cannot speak about the individual because he is unique. And, as I said before, it is a Catholic belief that all individuals are directly related to God and He has not chosen to let us know His ways with individuals.

Our position, therefore, is predicated simply upon the modes of dealing with humanity as a society that He has chosen to reveal to us, and hence that is why no Catholic ever presumes (and the fact was canonized, of course, by Pius IX) to pronounce upon any other individual at all. We regard the individual and his relations to God as sacred, and I would never presume to pass judgment, not only upon any individual who is not a member of the Catholic Church, but upon any Catholic. I stand responsible to no individual except myself, nor do I presume to pass judgment upon any individual.

You have, therefore, two rather distinct problems. On one, of course, we maintain we have illumination: God's social way of dealing with humanity. On the other hand, He has not told us how He deals with individuals, especially those individuals to whom the Christian revelation is not actually accessible. That is a tremendous problem itself, over which Catholics have many a headache.

Thank you.

LECTURE III - FEBRUARY 24, 1942

I think I will first, as has been my custom, briefly recapitulate the points made in the previous lectures. It is a bit difficult to hold things in mind from week to week.

As you doubtless remember, in the first lecture I made the point that the Catholic Church's first great contribution to the solution of the problem of religion and society is in the form of an idea, the idea of the concrete unity of the whole human family. I don't think that the value of that contribution ought to be underestimated, nor its contemporary importance be overlooked.

We have seen in our own time--even my own time, which doesn't go back so very far--the rise of ideas that are directly opposed to it and that have a tremendous force for change in the world. We have seen the rise of the various mysticisms of race, of culture, and of class. They have been comparatively recently born, they are still operating, and their operation, as we know, is devastating, seductive ideologies, that are seductive, of course, like all error, because of the element of truth that is in them, but ideologies that, because they are false, necessarily will lead to disastrous consequences for humanity.

Against these particularistic mysticisms the Church opposes her dynamic idea of humanity as a whole, her universalistic idea in her view of man, her real idea, not a sentiment, but a real idea, which has behind it all the power and all the inspiration that comes to the Catholic from that the fact that that idea is associated with the person of Christ.

In the second lecture I made the point that in our view the unity of humanity is going to be achieved only by the effective alliance of both human and divine energies, and I made the point, also, that it is our belief that divine energies are actually at work in the world and that they are simply waiting for man's alliance with them. We believe that the lost unity of mankind is actually in a process of re-formation.

That, of course, is a resounding affirmation, one that enshrines a very bright hope, but one that calls for some justification. Our justification for that belief and that hope is very simple. It rests on the facts of history, on two facts: first, on the great supreme fact upon which the whole of Catholic concept of religion is based, namely, the fact that the incarnation of the Son of God actually happened. The first message of the Church to her children is not, "Believe this," or "Do this." She calls her children to the crib at Bethlehem and points to the infant there. That is the basis of her whole faith.

The second fact upon which our belief in this re-formation of the lost unity of mankind rests is the fact that the Church exists and that she is the mystical body of Christ, the continuation in time and in space of His incarnation. She, we believe, is the catholic unity wherein mankind is to find his unity, a unity which mankind will vainly seek elsewhere. It is she who teaches her children that sense of responsibility not only for themselves but for all the world, for each nation, and for each individual that makes up humanity, that which perished by sin and that which Christ came to restore.

Specifically, in the second lecture, I made the point that the supreme article of the Christian credo, which is, of course, belief not simply in God but belief in God made man,

enshrines three affirmations, three ideas, that are of enormous importance in their pertinence to this whole problem of religion and society.

The first of them is this: the validity and the necessity of human nature with all its resources in the work of man's salvation. We believe that God has put the world, the present and the future, into the hands of men. He has confided to human nature the redoubtable mission of creating a human life here upon earth, of calling into being those institutions of a temporal nature which will contribute to a human order of life here on earth.

That is a task for men, but secondly, the Incarnation and the theology teach us also the radical insufficiency of the resources of human nature left to themselves to accomplish this work. Man, of himself, cannot save himself in the integral sense of that word "save." Human effort, therefore, we teach, must be inspired and supported and directed by a higher power, a power that we call "grace". That higher power is the Holy Spirit of God, the energy of God as he was called by the Greek Fathers, the Spirit of Christ, the Word of God, operating in this world. We believe, of course, that God in Christ personally entered the world at a particular time of its history, precisely in order to enable man, in the literal sense of that word "enable", to achieve what otherwise would be impossible of achievement for him, his lost unity and his lost humanity.

The third affirmation, implicit in our theology of the Incarnation, is the affirmation of the adequacy of the divine and the human when they are with each other strongly allied. To us, the doctrine of the Incarnation, of course, is the doctrine of triumph. We accept literally the verse of St. Paul in his Letter to the Corinthians: "For he must reign until He has put all His enemies under His feet" (1 Cor 15:25). The enemies of Christ, of course, are those of humanity: Satan, error, sin, death--all the disruptive forces that are operative in this world. We do not minimize their power, of course: our view, though optimistic, is not tinged with any bit of Pollyannaism. There are evil forces, disorderly, unruly forces, operating in this world. They are deploying all their activity against the plan of God for human unity, endeavoring to shatter that which God is endeavoring to re-form with His human allies.

Nevertheless, we believe that these forces of evil and destruction will have no final triumph. Whatever the vicissitudes of human history may be, however dark at particular periods the cause of human unity may look, nevertheless we believe that God has willed the unity of man. We believe that Christ has prayed for it, has demanded it, from His Father, and precisely for those reasons we believe that it will be achieved.

It always remains possible, of course, for individuals to separate themselves from that unity. There is always the possibility of willful error. There is the possibility of a surrender to egoism, to culpable weakness that refuses to take a firm stand against the solicitations of passion. Hence, individuals can separate themselves from that unity. No one will be separated from it save through his own culpable fault, but the unity, itself, we believe, will be passionate [*sic*: fashioned?].

History will culminate, as I said, in the formation of that one new man of whom St. Paul speaks in at least three different passages in his Letters; and we believe that not to be found a member of that one new Man is to be outside of the family of God, to be cut off from communion with God, and by that very fact to be cut off from communion with men, to be left in

isolation, to be alone eternally. And that is what we mean when we speak of hell--eternal loneliness.

So much, therefore, for a summary of our two previous lectures. Today I would like to take up the subject of the relation between the spiritual and the temporal mission of the Church--her spiritual mission which can be formulated as her task of saving souls and her temporal mission which can be formulated as her task of creating in this world those institutions which make for a proper human life.

In order to understand from the inside out, which is, of course, the way that I am talking to you and the way that I think you would expect me to talk to you, in order to understand the relation between the spiritual and the temporal mission of the Church as the Church herself understands it, I think we shall have to go back again to Christ. All things, be they doctrines or moral practices or ceremonial prescriptions in Catholicism, can be understood from the inside out only in reference to Christ.

As you know, in the order of natural reason the principle of intelligibility of all things is the principle of contradiction, and such-wise, if I have an argument which seems to me fallacious, I need only draw conclusion after conclusion from it. If my last conclusion amounts to a denial of the principle of contradiction, then I am certain that my initial position was fallacious.

What the principle of contradiction is in the order of natural reason, we hold Christ in His own person to be in the order, the supernatural order, of religion. He is to us the principle of intelligibility of all religion, of our own concept of religion. His mission, of course, on earth was primarily and properly a spiritual mission. As you remember in His great high-priestly prayer at the Last Supper, reported in the last [*sic*] chapter of St. John, he said: "I have finished the work that Thou gavest me to do."¹ And how did He describe that work? "I have manifested Thy name to the men whom Thou gavest me out of the world" (Jn 17:6). His essential work was the manifestation of the name of God, not the name of God as one that had been known before, but the name of God as Father, the name of God as Father not primarily of men, but the name of God as Father of an eternal Son, which He Himself was, incarnate.

His mission, therefore, was essentially, as we conceive it, a doctrinal mission. By revealing Himself as Son, He revealed the Father as Father, and similarly, by revealing Himself as Son incarnate, He revealed to us the plan of God, that all those who are vitally attached to Him by faith and love are by that very fact sons of God, members of His family. His doctrinal mission was therefore a prophetic mission. His prophetic mission, if you wish to call it that, was basic.

He had also, as we conceive it, a regal mission, a royal mission. He was not only a prophet but a King. He was invested, therefore, with legislative authority, the authority to perfect the moral law, to clarify its prescriptions. And He was invested supremely, of course, with the priestly mission. That was His climactic work, the work of sealing with His own blood a new covenant between God and man, and perpetuating His sacrifice in the Church.

Reading His life as it is given to us in the historical records of the Gospels, we can see how He emphasized continually the spiritual character of His mission. He stood against the

¹ Jn 17:4, so not the last chapter in the Fourth Gospel.

temptation to bring to man a purely earthly salvation. As you doubtless know, that is the intimate meaning of His temptations in the desert--His rejection of the ideal [*sic*] of a carnal Messianism, and His devotion of Himself to the will of His heavenly Father, that the Kingdom of God and the reign of God that He would establish was to be a spiritual reign.

On one occasion we read that He refused the kingship that might have been His at a word. He foiled every attempt to bring Him into conflict with the usurping political authority of the time. He spoke the immortal sentence: "Render, therefore, unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Mt 22:21). To us that sentence is a commonplace. When it first fell from His lips, it was revolutionarily new. He refused also to be a judge on one occasion between man and man, because that was the field in which secular authority was competent.

He maintained, therefore, a clear distinction between two orders, the eternal and the temporal, the order of the specifically secular and the order of the specifically religious. He maintained the distinction of these two orders but not by any means their separation. We know from the records of His life that he was supremely interested in the temporal happiness of men and that he gave to men many gifts that integrate [*sic*, indicate?] temporal happiness. He healed their diseases on three occasions. He called back from the dead members of a family whose death had shattered the family, the son of the widow of Naim, the brother of the two sisters, Mary and Martha, Lazarus; and the daughter of Jairus.

He was interested, therefore, I say, supremely in the temporal happiness of men. He pointed to these miracles precisely as signs of His divine and religious and spiritual mission. When the embassy came to him from John the Baptist, asking him if he were the coming one, He told them to go back and tell John what they had seen: the blind see, the deaf hear, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, and to the lowly the glad message of salvation is announced (Mt 11:4-5).

These miracles, as we conceive them, were not only acts of power, but they were more intimately revelations and signs of love, of that strong pity of God with humanity which has nothing in common with sheer humanitarian sentiment, but is a creative love.

As we read it, therefore, in His life, the divine power that dwells in him corporally, as St. Paul says, overflowed into the temporal order of man and brought healing to man even in his material earthly life. We read that power went out from Him and healed all, because His mission in its totality was not simply the healing of men's souls from the wounds of error and ignorance and passion, but also was to be the healing of men's bodies, because, as I think I said before, the adequate formula for salvation as God conceived it is not the salvation simply of the soul, but the salvation of men and of women who are souls and bodies.

The Church's mission in the temporal order is to be conceived of--she conceives of it--exactly in the same way. It is the overflow into the temporal order of human culture and civilization of the divine power that dwells in her.

You see, therefore--and this is the point that I want to make first--that the action of the Church in the temporal order is indirect and subordinate, and yet, paradoxically, it is all the more fruitful for that reason. There is the famous sentence of Leo XIII in his Encyclical letter on the Christian Constitution of States. It is called the *Immortale Dei*. In it he says: "The Church, the

imperishable handiwork of the all-merciful God, has for her immediate and natural purpose the saving of souls and the securing of our happiness in heaven. Yet in regard to things temporal, it is the source of benefits so manifold and so great that it could not confer more or greater ones if the first and greatest aim of its existence were to insure the prosperity of our earthly life."²

That, I say, is a paradox, and yet it can be seen verified in the lives of those who have most perfectly participated in the life of the Church, namely, her saints. The life of the Church, in its benevolent effects, has its reflection in the individual lives of these men and women. One thinks, for instance, of a man like John of God, St. Vincent de Paul, Catherine McCauley, the founder of the Sisters of Mercy, Teresa of Avila. They were men and women who had abandoned the world, who had rejected it as the base of their lives. Their sole aim in life was to live simply and solely for God, and yet the action that they exerted upon the world as such was incalculable. The institutions that they founded still endure and bring happiness and solace to millions.

I think also of my dear friend, Miss Mary Merrick.³ Perhaps you have heard of her. She is the foundress of the Christ Child Society, a woman who has been a cripple all her life, who lives in a steel brace from the waist up, with a chin rest that is needed if she is to maintain any posture at all, because of an early injury to her spine. Prostrate upon a bed, encased in this steel brace, her mind, as I know from many talks with her, fills solely with the thought of God and of Christ, and of the work that He meant her to do on earth. She has brought happiness into the lives of literally thousands of mothers and children. Their specific work, of course, is among the families of the poor, the making of layettes, I think they are called, which are distributed. Then, of course, there is educational work, the maintenance of summer farms where these poor children from slums can have a bit of vacation. That is the work that she has done, a work of marvelous beneficence, and a work, however, that is undertaken simply and solely not for love of men primarily but for love of God.

There is, of course, the example of the contemplatives who, of course, have always existed in the Catholic Church and always will exist. I can hardly pause to speak of them at length, because that would bring in another large subject, namely, the social value of the ascetic ideal, the ideal of those who apparently flee the world, not because they condemn the world as evil, or wish simply to have no traffic with it, but those who choose to live separated and isolated apparently from the world in order, however, that their work in the world may be more fecund. That, of course, was the great idea of Teresa of Avila, the great Spanish mystic, whose ideal of the mystical and ascetical life was no ideal of evasion or escape. She had, in her isolation, all the world in her heart and by her prayer, as well as by her active work, of course, she exerted upon the world a beneficent effect.

The point that I want to make, however, is that the Church's action in the temporal order is indirect and subordinate. It is an overflow.

The source of it is precisely the Holy Spirit of God who, as we believe, dwells in the Church. We think, and love to think often, of those promises that Christ made at His Last Supper

² The encyclical *Immortale Dei* was issued in 1885. Murray would later devote several essays to Leo's thought.

³ Mary Virginia Merrick (1866-1955) was a Catholic social reformer, founder of the Christ Child Society.

with His own: "And I shall ask the Father and He will give you a new Paraclete, the Spirit of truth who will abide with you forever" (Jn 14:16). The promise was manifested visibly and fulfilled at Pentecost, of course, and it is the power of the Holy Spirit dwelling in the Church that is the source not only of her effectiveness in the spiritual order, but the source, too, of her effectiveness of in the temporal order of human culture and civilization.

Let me, therefore, briefly develop that idea: how to reconceive this Holy Spirit who dwells in the Church and why it is that His indwelling is a source of beneficent effects in the temporal order. We conceive the Holy Spirit as essentially three things: He is, first of all, the Spirit of truth; He is secondly the Spirit, as St. Paul calls Him, of power and law and discipline; and He is thirdly, and supremely, the Spirit of love.

Because He is these three things, and because He operates through His human instruments in the Church, therefore it is that Leo XIII says that the action of the Church in the purely temporal order surpasses in beneficence what it would be even if it had been the primary and direct object of the Church's mission. You remember, if you have read the life of St. Ignatius by Francis Thompson,⁴ he has a splendid development of that idea: that the saints, when they chose, as he says, to turn their hands to earthly tasks, accomplished more that was permanent and durable than those whose lives were cast precisely in the framework of temporal society and who lived specifically and solely and directly for its improvement--social improvement.

The Holy Spirit, therefore, as we conceive Him is first of all the Spirit of truth who animates the Church in the exercise of her magisterial office. As the mission of Christ was essentially doctrinal, so also we conceive the mission of His Church to be essentially doctrinal. And His doctrine was promulgated with the authority that was His, because He possessed the mind of God, being God. So also we conceive of her magisterial office to be authoritative, because she possesses in its integrity His mind, the mind of Christ, the Word of God. It is precisely and fundamentally by this exercise of a magisterial office that the Church makes her first contribution to the problem of religion and society.

Her authority, namely, is exercised in order to liberate man from his basic enslavement, enslavement to error. Our concept of the magisterial authority of the Church, of course, has a double base. It is based, first of all, upon the fact, as we believe, that Christ committed to His Church His own prophetic office with all its prerogatives. It is based, secondly, upon the idea of human nature that he left us and that we have. We conceive of human nature as essentially prone to error. Not indeed because the human intellect in itself is not an adequate, fit instrument for the acquisition of truth, no; but because the human intellect in its operation is subject to the sway of sense and of passion, it can come under the dominion of egoistic interest. We all have that experience frequently enough: that we believe that to be true which we want to be true.

Moreover, the human intellect in its operation is subject also to certain social limitations. The mind can be imprisoned in the tradition into which it was born and in which it has been brought up. It can be bound and limited, because it exists only and operates in a particular historical and social context. Hence, because the human intellect has this proneness to error, the authority of Christ and of His Church exercises upon it not a restrictive influence, as we conceive it, but essentially a liberative influence.

⁴ Francis Thomas, *Saint Ignatius Loyola* (New York, Chicago, Cincinnati: Benziger Bros., 1910).

You see, therefore, that in her concept of human reason, the Church takes the position, and historically did take the position, in opposition to the idea of human reason that obtained in the philosophy of what has been aptly named "Dawnism,"⁵ the idea, namely, that the use of human reason, unfettered human reason, human reason that has slipped off all the bonds, as they thought, of superstitious religion and what-not, the use of unfettered human reason would somehow insure the dawn of a golden age and would bring to men freedom from the triple evil that Rousseau, for instance, saw threatening man: reason would free man from ignorance, free him from suffering, and free him from slavery.

That particular philosophy committed the salvation of man, of course, wholly and entirely to man himself, and its supreme instrument in its achievement would be, of course, human reason. The philosophy of Dawnism had its political expression in the theory of representative democracy. It had its economic expression in the theory of laissez faire capitalism, and its working philosophy was the philosophy of the nineteenth century, scientific progress inevitably accumulative, unthwartable scientific progress, so that man by his own power would become master of his own environment and ultimately create himself, unaided here on earth, a human life that would leave nothing to be desired. That philosophy believed that human nature was fundamentally sweetly reasonable, and that one had only to appeal to its sweet reasonableness in order to achieve these glorious objectives, this order of liberty, democracy and peace to which they looked forward.

We have seen whither that philosophy has led the world. Historically, the Church took a position against that philosophy. In the famous Syllabus of Pius IX, the essential positions of liberalism, as it is called, or Dawnism--call it what you will--were rejected. I simply give it as an exercise of the Church's magisterial office in the interests of temporal civilization and culture, because I think by anyone the hypothesis should be entertained that had the world at that time listened to the voice of Pius IX, we might very well have been spared some of the disastrous consequences of that philosophy that we are suffering today.

In the exercise of her magisterial office, which is related not simply to man's eternal salvation, but to his human life here on earth, the Church mediates to him, as we conceive it, two kinds of truth. The first kind, of which she is primarily the depositary, is revealed truth, those truths, namely, about God and about God's plan for man which would be inaccessible to human reason if left to itself: the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, for instance, the mystery of the Incarnation, the mystery of the Church itself, and all those other mysteries which integrate [*sic*] the Catholic dogmatic system.

Besides, however, revealed truth, the Church also mediates natural truth, truths, namely, that would be and are accessible to human reason left to itself, but whose grasp is difficult for mankind. In the second group are truths, for instance, of philosophy: what the human soul is, whence it came, whither it is destined to go. This group contains, also, fundamental truths of human morality: the morality, for instance, of marriage, the inconsistency of divorce with the

⁵ Murray probably borrowed the term from Michael de la Bedoyere whose *Christian Crisis* (New York: MacMillan, 1942) devotes a whole chapter to it and refers to it many times throughout his book; he says, "'Dawnism' was coined by Hugh Kingsmill in his novel *The Dawn's Delay*. I use it throughout as a much more significant and comprehensive word than the commoner 'Liberalsim' or 'Progress'" (p. 13n).

natural law. The prohibition of divorce in the Catholic Church is not an arbitrary thing as we conceive it. It is simply the enunciation of a prohibition that is contained in the natural law itself and that man, by his reason, could arrive at. Many other truths of the natural order are mediated by the Church. For instance, the truth of the equality of man with man. We conceive this authoritative teaching of these truths to be necessary in a relative sense, in order, namely, that these truths may be easily and securely held by all men.

I quote, therefore, the Vatican Council on this subject, and the first point is that by the exercise of her magisterial function, by her conveying to men authoritatively these two types of truths, revealed truth and natural truth, the Church liberates man from his basic enslavement, namely, to error. That is the first activity of the Holy Spirit in the Church as we conceive of it.

The second activity is the product of His character as the Spirit of power and law and discipline, because the Church conceives herself to be the temple of the Holy Spirit who is the spirit of power and of discipline. Therefore, she conceives herself as empowered to impose upon men moral obligations. Her authority, therefore, is not only doctrinal but also legislative.

This legislative authority also has a double base. Her exercise of it is justified by her belief that it is communicated to her by Christ, who was himself King and whose kingly mission was passed to her. The necessity of it is based also upon her idea of human nature. We do not share that idealistic view of human nature propagated by Rousseau, the theory of the noble savage, that all men's instincts are good, that all that he needs is to be liberated from social controls, allowed to express himself, and the result would be perfection in humanity. On the contrary, we regard human nature as essentially in need of discipline, of restraints whose purpose is not simply to restrain but, again, to liberate. We believe that the instincts of men are not evil, but they are unruly, they are disordered. We believe that in every human being there is that core of ego-centricity. We believe, to put it another way, that all of us are just a little bit mad, with that specific type of madness which consists, as the psychiatrist describes it, of having delusions of self-reference. We are deluded into the belief so very easily that everything that is, somehow should be and is referred to us, that we are, as it were, the center of the universe, even perhaps only of that particular small universe in which we live; whereas the truth is not that. That is definitely a delusion, and hence we have that much, at any rate, in common with that particular type of what is definitely madness.

The Church regards man, therefore, not as a noble savage, but as very much a child, or, to use the Gospel metaphor, she regards mankind as sheep. Sheep are very lovely, charming animals. Their one defect, of course, is that they have no sense of direction. If you have ever seen them active as I have--I remember being held up on a road in Ireland for two hours while the shepherd was endeavoring to marshal again a flock of sheep that had been startled and dispersed by the sound of our ancient automobile in which we were creaking from Toulmin[?] down to Galway. They have no sense of direction. They need to be guided. They are good, but they wander, they stray.

Men are not only sheep, but men also, in the concept of the Church, are open to the solicitations of the personal spirit of evil. They need, therefore, a strengthening against his solicitations. They need, in a word, a voice that is both maternal and authoritative, whose utterances are designed not primarily to impose restrictions, as I said, but to liberate, to liberate

man not so much here from that enslavement to error which is his basic enslavement, but to liberate him from his enslavement to matter, which is another fundamental human enslavement.

The Holy Spirit, therefore, as it operates in the Church, being the Spirit of discipline, imposes these moral obligations which themselves strengthen the spirit of man to stand firmly against the solicitations of the material world, and the solicitations, too, of the evil spirit. And that moral obligation which the Church conceives herself as empowered to impose not simply upon individuals but also upon nations is her second great contribution to order and peace and stability to all human values in the temporal order.

Thirdly, the Holy Spirit in the Church is the Spirit of love. In the theology of the Blessed Trinity, of course, the Holy Spirit is called the bond of the Trinity, the bond of union. At the end of every one of our prayers in Mass and also in other liturgical functions, we always use the concluding formula: "Through our Lord Jesus Christ, who livest and reignest with Thee in the unity of the Holy Spirit, God, world without end. Amen." It is in the unity of the Holy Spirit that God the Father, and God the Son are one, and what the Holy Spirit is in the Trinity that he also is in the Church--the bond of unity between God and man, and between man and man.

He indwells in the Church, the Body of Christ, as He dwelt in His fullness of in Christ, her head, and he is communicated sacramentally by the Church through [to?] her members, and that, of course, is the basis of the famous doctrine that you know of, of the efficacy of the sacraments [*ex opere operato*], as it is called. It is through the sacraments that the Church communicates to her members of the Holy Spirit: in baptism at their entrance into the Church; confirmation, when they receive the added share of the priesthood of Christ; orders, when the full share of the priesthood of Christ is accorded; matrimony, when the sanctification of the natural bond of love between man and woman is made by the blessing of the Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit, therefore, is the Spirit, as he is called by St. Paul, of sonship, the Spirit of the sonship of God, and by that very fact, the Spirit of the brotherhood of man. He indwells in the Church. He indwells also in each one of her members, as a force, what I might call a de-individualizing force. We believe, as I said, that there is at the heart of each man and woman this core of ego-centricity. It is the function of the indwelling Holy Spirit to replace that core of ego-centricity with a core of charity, which is, of course, the supreme Christian virtue. He indwells there to cure us of our habit of referring all things to ourselves and to impart to us the habit of reference to others, because that is by definition charity, the living, the thinking, the acting for others.

The Spirit of love, therefore, that indwells in the Spirit [*sic*] in the Church is not a mere humanitarian sentiment, but is a strong love grounded upon truth, upon theological truth. It is, therefore, a Spirit that of its nature should be removed from the vacillation that all sentiments are exposed to when their foundation is simply emotional.

By this triple gift, therefore, the gift of liberation from error through the exercise of her magisterial function, the gift of liberation from enslavement to matter and to passion by the exercise of her legislative function, and, above all, by her supreme gift of the indwelling spirit of love, the Church makes her basic contributions to the problems of religion and society, because this triple gift, which is really one, although its primary purpose is to lead and direct mankind to his eternal goal and destiny, nevertheless has its overflow in the purely temporal order.

So much, therefore, having been said, we have, I think, at least in outline the basic underlying ideas of all Catholic thought on this problem. Next time I should like to take up and give you an illustration of how concretely the Church operates in the temporal order through a particular organization, let us call it, that has a Catholic inspiration and that has, moreover, received a special commendation from the supreme head of the Church, the Pope. I mean the Jocist movement as inaugurated in Belgium, the Lausist [*sic*] and the Jussist [*sic*] movements. I think by study of a movement like that, a social movement within the Church, we will be in a position to bring down into the concrete all the ideas that we have seen very much, I am afraid, in the abstract.

If there are any questions, let us see if we can discuss them.

QUESTION: Will you kindly repeat that prayer at the end of Mass?

FATHER MURRAY: "Through our Lord Jesus Christ, Thy Son, who livest and reignest with Thee in the unity of the Holy Spirit, God, world without end. Amen."

QUESTION: Thank you.

FATHER MURRAY: That is, of course, the conclusion, and the purpose of adding it is always to cast the mind upwards and outwards to the supreme object of the Catholic faith, Christ enthroned at the right hand of the Father, living with Him in the unity of the Holy Spirit.

QUESTION: In addition to the offices of the Holy Ghost that you mentioned, in the Bible he is spoken of as the Holy Ghost, the Comforter. Under what heading would you bring that? Would that be in connection with the ones you mentioned, or is that perhaps a separate function?

FATHER MURRAY: There is, of course, that difficulty about the meaning of "Paraclete" in the Gospel. I think it exigently [*sic*: exegetically?, etymologically?] to have, fundamentally, an intellectual connotation; namely, the basic meaning is that of an advocate. Therefore, one who convinces, as he says in another place, the world of sin and justice. The Holy Spirit, in the sense of Comforter, we would rather think of as a derived meaning, a real office, therefore, which is exercised, but rather more in an accidental sense, that is to say, accidental if you take comfort there to mean simply some form of interior sweetness whereby the soul is given an experience of her union with God, or forgiveness, or some other spiritual sentiment of that kind.

Those inner experiences of sweetness and of consolation, as we call it, though very real and deriving from the Holy Spirit, are to us rather secondary and accidental in His function in the Church.

QUESTION: Doesn't it convey the idea of assurance, too?

FATHER MURRAY: Assurance of what?

QUESTION: Well, assurance of being a child of God and that sort of thing.

FATHER MURRAY: Assurance, yes, in the sense of hope, of a firmly grounded hope, the hope that St. Paul says does not confound, but, of course, not assurance as we conceive it in any infallible sense.

QUESTION: But the idea of the Paraclete is very prominent in connection with the third person of the Trinity in the New Testament.

FATHER MURRAY: Oh, definitely yes. Well, that would seem, therefore, to be all. Thank you.

LECTURE IV - MARCH 10, 1942⁶

It was agreed, I think, at the luncheon meeting that was held by the four lecturers on this program, which deals with Religion and Society, that our lectures should touch upon those social doctrines that our particular traditions have to offer and, secondly, on the social programs that each of us has to offer.

I have spent three lectures in indicating some of the leading ideas that make up the Catholic Church's social doctrine. In their generality, as I pointed out, they all derive from our basic tenet or belief, namely, our faith in the Incarnation. In other words, you remember, the concrete unity of the human family as originally planned by God, which plan was shattered by original sin, and remade again by the fact of the Incarnation, when the Son of God assumed human nature to become the new head of the human race.

I spoke, secondly, of the mode of realization of that unity as the Church conceives it. That mode of realization is patterned by our faith in the Incarnation. The unity of mankind is to be accomplished, I said, by the alliance of both human and divine energies in the course of a historical process.

I spoke, thirdly, of the mode of realization of that spiritual unity of mankind as the Church conceives it to be achieved through her temporal mission. My point there was to point out the essentially religious character of the Church's temporal mission. All the benefits that she seeks to give to the temporal order of society are simply the overflow from the indwelling Spirit of God that is the source of all her activity in all spheres.

Today, I would like to speak about the Catholic social program. The Catholic Church has, of course, a very definite social program, the exposition of which in its totality would require a considerable number of lectures, and hence I must confine myself rather more to outlines.

The Church's social program in the modern world is all summed up, then, for us under the general rubric of what we call "Catholic Action." I would like to speak, therefore, first of all, about Catholic Action, what it is in its general meaning and, if there be time, though I doubt that there will be time, to speak also about one of its particular realizations.

Catholic Action, in a sense, is a new thing in the Catholic Church and, in another sense, it is not a new thing. It is not a novelty in this sense: as if the Church only recently began to interest itself in the problems of human society and in the temporal order. On the contrary, from her first inception she has always sought, as an essential part of her mission, to create on earth those institutions and to disseminate those ideas which would assist man to live an integrally human life here on earth, because that is part of the plan of God, that man should be a man in the fullest sense of the word here on earth.

Nor is Catholic Action a novelty in this sense: as if the essential elements of the Church's social apostolate have changed today. Those essential elements really are three: There is the teaching of the Word of God as it is contained in Scripture and in the living tradition of the Church. There is, secondly, the administration of the Sacraments, which are those social

⁶ This lecture is little more than a translated paraphrase of an article by Henri Carpay, "La nouveauté de l'Action catholique," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 62 (1935): 477-95.

channels through which, we believe, the Holy Spirit reaches men to sanctify them, to unite them with God and with each other. Thirdly, there is the formation of souls to the discipline of Christian morality. That formation takes the form of instruction very largely in the moral law and instruction also in those social and personal forms of worship which are essential means towards religious education.

The essential methods of the Church, therefore, remain the same and her essential interests remain the same. Her interest simply is in the creation of such a temporal order as will enable man to live a human life here on earth in accord with the plan of God. The differences in the Church's social apostolate today, as throughout her history, derive simply from the different reactions that the world opposes to her effort. The differences in her apostolate derive from the differences in the social context in which she has to work.

Those differences in the social context demand certain adaptations. Certain opportunities are offered to her; certain other opportunities are denied; certain methods are dictated. It seemed to me that in order to grasp the character of Catholic Action in its novelty, we should very briefly review the different epochs in the life of the Church and see the general character of her apostolate in each of them. Of course, here I have to go in for a good bit of simplification, but I think that the main lines are true and clear. We could distinguish about six periods in the life of the Catholic Church, each of which had its own particular form of social apostolate.

The first period would run from Pentecost to the conversion of Constantine in the year 313. There the Church's effort was the effort at its purely spiritual penetration of the hostile pagan environment into which she was born. At her birth, the Church found, of course, a social order already constituted, a pagan social order that was opposed to her. The extent of its opposition, I think, can be gathered from even a casual acquaintance with the Letters of St. Paul to his pagan and gentile Churches. The first reaction of that pagan environment to the Church was the violent reaction of persecution. You had the ten great persecutions from Nero to Diocletian. Those persecutions themselves created a particular form of social apostolate. The form may be that of the martyrs. It was by the testimony that they gave through their deaths that the martyrs of the Church exercised their apostolate in their particular world, and largely by the deaths of the martyrs, the Church, the community, grew from soul to soul.

There grew up, therefore, alongside of the pagan community a Christian community, and the two communities were in opposition and in hostility to each other. The temporal order, in other words, was at war with the spiritual order. In that war the Church's means of combat were purely spiritual.

The capitulation of pagan society, of course, occurred at the conversion of Constantine in the year 313, and that ushered in the second period in the Church's social apostolate, which second period ran, generally speaking, from the fourth century up to the medieval period. The general characteristic of the Church's social apostolate during those centuries consisted in the fact that in her spiritual work she had the alliance of the temporal power. After the conversion of Constantine the social situation was very different from what it had been before. Before it had been dangerous to be a Christian. Afterwards it was advantageous to be one. The result was a great expansion of the Christian community, an expansion that, like all rapid expansion, was somewhat superficial and hence had within itself certain dangers.

The spiritual and temporal powers were allied at the time, or, I might better say, they were confused. You had during the ensuing centuries a curious mixture of the temporal and the spiritual. At times one predominated, and at other times the other predominated. Initially, of course, the temporal power predominated over the Church, and hence you have the era of caesaro-papism, during which a strong organized political state dominated the weaker, relatively more unorganized Church. That period of the dominance of the temporal over the spiritual was put to an end by the barbarian invasions when the Roman political power was destroyed, and there ensued that period of chaos. Only one power, of course, stood against that barbarian invasion and that was the spiritual power of the Church. The famous meeting of Leo the Great and Attila the Hun at Mantua in 452 marked not only a great historical event, but also constituted a symbol, the inception namely of a period during which the spiritual power predominated over the temporal.

Beginning from that time the Church assumed a position as the molding force of European civilization. She assumed the mantle of the educator of Europe, because at that time she was possessed of the triple power that has always fashioned cultures and civilizations: the power of sanctity: religion; the power of knowledge: science; and the political power that can create institutions.

There were, of course, many divagations. You had not only Charlemagne, but you had also the Age of Iron;⁷ and you had many conflicts, too, the greatest and last of them being, of course, that which reached its climax at Canossa, between Henry IV and Gregory VII. With Gregory VII, of course, the ascendancy of the Church was completely established, and it was to endure until the fifteenth century in European society.

The prime characteristic of that particular age--I am speaking again only in general--was that compenetration of the spiritual and the temporal. We can't exactly speak of a union of the two, because when you speak of union you mean that the two elements of the union are distinct, whereas there was no proper distinction made at that time between the temporal order and the spiritual order. Neither one of them had attained that degree of organization and of elaboration that was necessary in order that they might exist in distinction one from the other. We did not have at that time the two perfect societies that could confront one another and between which there could be no question, properly, of union. The pope, the spiritual head of Christendom, intervened directly in the temporal order by his authority, and he presided over the initial steps of the formation of the national states which began to take their rise about that time.

You see, therefore, what I said, that the Church's social apostolate at that time involved the use of the temporal power, added to or conceived as inherent in her own spiritual power. She put at the services of her own social ideal temporal resources, riches, armies, alliances with princes, and other such purely temporal means. The effect was that she created a temporal society that was in harmony with herself and with her own principles, a society that accepted her moral postulates, her institutions, her spirit, her laws--her aim, of course, always remaining the same: to create that social milieu in which souls could live and reach God and His truth. Her aim at that period was to save the world by civilizing it.

⁷ The term used by medieval historians to refer to the tenth century.

In the third period, the medieval period, that action of the Church reached its climax. That was the period of a united Christendom in Europe, and the Church's social apostolate naturally took the form of direct spiritual action of the Church upon the souls, souls which existed already in a Christian environment. During the medieval period one could hardly speak of the true social apostolate as such, because in a sense there was no need of such an apostolate. Christian ideals and customs and laws were prevalent and were accepted. There existed in Christendom a spiritual unity through the unity of one faith and of one obedience.

You could distinguish five Christian ideas that prevailed at that period. The first is that symbolized in the crowning of the emperor by the pope. The Christian idea involved, of course, in that symbolic action was that all authority derives from God and that the spiritual has the primacy over the temporal.

The second idea you see embodied in the medieval guilds in which work was organized not simply for purposes of sheer production, but was organized in view of the sanctification of men.

The third idea was embodied in the laws of the time, laws which sanctioned the decalogue of law and which obliged in conscience, derived their force from the moral law of God.

The fourth idea was embodied in the science of the time. It was the age of the great flowering of theological science, when theology was recognized as the queen of sciences.

Fifthly, the last idea was embodied in the arts, whose whole purpose was the evocation of the supernatural realities of faith. The chef-d'oeuvre of the time, of course, was the medieval cathedral, which has always been recognized as the perfect embodiment of the medieval spirit.

In the fourteenth century there began a period of crises, which ran until the eighteenth. During the medieval period, of course, the social task of the Church was not completed. It was really only sketched. Moreover, the social order that was constituted at that time had one grave defect that has always been recognized by Catholic writers. There was, namely, in the medieval period too much mutual engagement of the temporal in the spiritual and the spiritual in the temporal. That was the result not so much of any theory, but of a sheerly practical development: that is the way things were done. The theory whereby the temporal had its own particular validity and was adequately distinct from the spiritual had been formulated already by St. Thomas Aquinas, but, as you know very well, it is a long step from the formulation of an idea in theory to its reduction in practice. That essential weakness, therefore, threatened the medieval social order.

In a dialectic of history that would be purely abstract, the next step in human progress would have been the strengthening of the Christian unity and the Christian order by a progressive differentiation of its two elements, the spiritual and the temporal. That was indicated, and that was to have been desired. The theory that would preside over that development had already, I say, been formulated.

The necessity for that differentiation of the spiritual and the temporal comes to view in the two great movements of the time, first, the movement for reform and, secondly, the movement of humanism, as it is called. The movement of reform was, of course, inaugurated at the great Council of Vienna in the year 1311. In the course of the discharge of her temporal

mission, the Church, as I said, got itself involved, badly involved at times, in the temporal order, and there came a cry for her disengagement from that temporal order and for a purification of the Church herself. That was a new apostolate, the apostolate of the Church, not to the world, but to herself; and it was carried on chiefly by two great means, the general councils held during that period and then, of course, the creation of the several religious orders, Dominicans and Franciscans notably, Franciscans, of course, chiefly.

Together with that movement, that desired reform, there was the humanistic movement. At that time, as you know, there arose that developing consciousness of human values, of human capacities, of human rights. There began that great efflorescence of intellectual life, the beginnings of a certain amount of material progress, a new epoch of culture, and, of course, the rise of the nascent states.

Both of those movements, you see, had the same effect. The purpose of the reform was to disengage the Church from the temporal order. The purpose of humanism was to disengage the temporal order from the Church. Hence, both of them followed the logic of the times. However, the differentiation of those two orders, like any great social movements, did not progress without checks and without excesses.

The aim was distinction between the two. What actually came about, however, was their separation, a rupture, and there ensued that very painful period in Christian history. The Church was humiliated, of course, by the captivity at Avignon. There entered, moreover, into the religious life of mankind the principle of private judgment erected into a criterion of revelation and of religious truth as opposed to the existent criterion, the doctrine of the authority of the Church. The advent of that principle was succeeded by the advent also of the principle of the absolute autonomy of human reason. The religious division of Europe was effected and has endured.

Parallel with that disruptive process in the spiritual order there took place also a disruptive process in the temporal order. Its motive, of course, was the same, a desire for autonomy, a desire in itself legitimate, but in its realizations excessive. The politicians of the times sought their inspiration no longer in Christian political and social theory, but in the theories of the pagan legalists. You had, of course, the principle of the divine right of kings, and you had the constitution of a secular state in hostility now to the Church, the pattern of the politician of the time being, of course, Philippe le Bel of France.

That process culminated in the French Revolution, at which time there was constituted the modern lay state, a state which is in opposition to the fundamental laws of the social order as the Church has conceived them, a state in which all the hierarchies, as they are conceived in their Christian sense, are shattered.

Authority is conceived of not only as no longer deriving from God, but as in a proper sense not really existing at all. According to the Rousseauistic political material [*sic*: theory?] of the *contrat social*", society governs itself by representatives, who do not possess strict authority, but who are simply functionaries. Men govern themselves through other men.

In the field of science the hierarchy was again shattered when the engineer supplanted the theologian as at the head of the hierarchy. In the field of science the principle ruled that truth was

a purely empirical thing, that there was no absolute metaphysical truth, and consequently you had the invasion of agnosticism.

In the field of law there took place a similar development. Law was conceived of as unrelated to the Decalogue, to the moral law of God. Consequently, there arose the concept of law as purely penal, law simply as the condition of a terrestrial good order, susceptible of indefinite correction because it had no stable and eternal foundations. It was the period of the divorce of politics from ethics.

Moreover, in the industrial field, the economic field, there took place also a disruptive development. Labor, work, was divorced from any moral sanctifying purpose. In the Manchester School of Economics, of course, the laborer was not properly conceived as a human being, but as so much muscle applied to such-and-such a machine. Labor was simply a means to wealth and not, as the medieval period had conceived it, a means to sanctification. The whole center of gravity of the secular state, of course, was on earth. Its aim was a material progress, divorced from all moral purpose. Instead of a cathedral, you had the factory with its assembly line embodying the spirit of the time, of that particular culture.

The growing secularism of the nationalistic [*sic*: nascent?] states induced, naturally, a growing hostility to religion. There wasn't any persecution in the primitive Christian sense, although you did have martyrs. My own society, the Society of Jesus, honors a group of martyrs, of the Commune as they are called, who were slain during the French Revolution for their faith.

However, what actually took place was this: that the wheel of history seemed to have come full-circle. The Christian Church existed once more in a pagan or, better, in a paganized society. It existed in a state of hostility to that society, and there was inaugurated a new age of conflict. That ushered in the fifth period in the Church's social apostolate, which can be said to run from 1789 to 1922, from the French Revolution to the advent of Pius XI as pope.

Characteristic of this period is a new effort at a purely spiritual penetration by the Church into the pagan temporal environment. The French Revolution, of course, circled the world, as you know, and it did two great things: First of all, it constituted the principle of a certain separation of the spiritual and the temporal order. Insofar as it did that, it did a good thing, and a thing that we would wish to be done, because the temporal and the spiritual orders are distinct and, as I said, in the logic and dialectic of history they should have progressively become distinct. Therefore, that was real progress.

On the other hand, the French Revolution in its principles consecrated the principle of the divorce of the temporal and the spiritual and brought them into hostility to each other, and in that was its sin. So far as it did that, it did evil. However, it did those two things, and once a thing is done it is done and that is the end of it. You cannot undo history.

That double effect [*sic*: fact; see notes] of the French Revolution had itself a double effect, one on the Church and the other on the state. It had this effect on the Church, on her spiritual life: It resulted in her impoverishment. First of all, the privileges of the Church during the ensuing regimes were, of course, terminated. The Church in England was divested of all her wealth. She was therefore rendered poor, and that was excellent. That was a tremendous contribution to the furtherance of the movement begun at the Council of Vienna in 1311, the movement towards the inner reform and purification of the Church. That movement, of course,

reached its greatest strength in the post-Tridentine period as a result of the impulse given it by the Council of Trent. She was excluded from worldly affairs and, hence, that exclusion itself contributed to a new purity and a new vitality in the life of the Church.

There was in effect, moreover, no place for the Church in the temporal order. The states at the time were professedly irreligious and that fact resulted in the destruction of a milieu favorable to Christian virtue. The institutions at the time were no longer Christian in their spirit. Of course, the masses of men, who are always at the mercy of the social forces brought to bear on them in their particular historical context, were the ones who suffered the greatest impact from these new spiritual forces, which were political, educational, economic, all different kinds of forces. These forces shaped a new culture that resulted in the progressive demoralization of the masses of men, and there took place, of course, what Pius XI was never tired of calling the great scandal of the nineteenth century: the apostasy of the working class from Christianity.

The French Revolution had [an] effect also, as I said, on the state. The first effect was good, a tremendous material progress. Undoubtedly, there resulted a period of enlightenment, of *Aufklärung*, as it is called, an efflorescence of sheerly human culture. There resulted the great movement of what has been very well called "Dawnism", a great confidence of man in his own resources, of reason, of technique, in his power to dominate his material environment, and to wrest it to his own purposes.

That material progress was very real and basically a very good and very desirable thing. However, unfortunately, that material progress was very largely rendered sterile. Why? Because it was divorced from all moral aim. The moral education of humanity did not keep pace with its material advance, and hence this material progress in the main was not a humanizing force in the deepest sense. It resulted not in the development of man's spiritual nature, but rather in the throttling of his spiritual nature. The term, of course, of that tremendous material progress has proved the basic vitiating factor that there was in it from the beginning, that divorce, namely, from moral purpose. It terminated, of course, in the capitalistic countries in the great economic crisis of our own times, and it terminated in other countries in Bolshevistic Communism.

This new situation dictated, naturally, a new form of apostolate that has been the Church's apostolate in the last hundred years, up to the year 1922. It was an apostolate essentially the same as that of the early Christian centuries, because the Church now had to operate in a society that not only was deficient in its practice of Christian principles, but a society that directly rejected Christian principles and pursued professedly secularist aims.

Moreover, her situation was analogous to that she occupied in her early days, because she was stripped now of all external political power. Her voice was not heeded in the problems of politics or of human society. She lived, furthermore, in a milieu definitely hostile to her spirit. Laws and institutions were not in harmony with her concepts, notably, for instance, the laws with regard to the institution of marriage, a permission of divorce. In the educational world, we had, of course, the secular school, the irreligious school, so-called neutral school, that actually has proved an irreligious force. In the field of morals, her principles were challenged by literature, by the cinema, by the theatre. I suppose no one would maintain that those three forms of public education that we know and that are so terribly powerful are impregnated with highly moral aims and have in the main contributed to the moral development of humanity. Moreover, a number of

other influences prevalent in the world, that were shaping the culture of the world, were inimical to her particular spirit: the spirit of rugged individualism in economic life, the idea that labor is a commodity to be bought in the open market, the notion that men are to devote themselves to sheer production, the production of material things simply for the sake of the production of material things.

The effect of all this social environment on the Church has been, of course, a new spiritual rebirth in her religious and devotional life. We have had, and we are very proud of having had, a series of Roman Pontiffs that can rank with any of the great religious leaders of history: Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV, and Pius XI. There took place a renovation of the clergy in learning and in piety, a tremendous outbreak of missionary activity and, most significantly, a development among the lay people of an elite.

Consequently, we come at last to the sixth period that I want to briefly indicate the characteristics of. It runs from 1922 to the present day. It is the period of Catholic Action. In our days it would seem very easily acceptable to say that the spiritual forces that have fashioned present-day world culture have spent their force for good. They did achieve in their time much good, and no one would wish to deny that; but they have not achieved, certainly, that which they professedly set out to achieve, the liberation of the human personality and the unity of human society.

The question now, as we conceive it, is: Will the nations in their disillusionment return to the Church and end the estrangement from the Catholic Church, who considers herself, in Leo XIII's phrase, "the Mother of peoples and their educator".⁸ Will they take up anew, in alliance with the Church and not in hostility to her, the secular work of the education and the civilization of mankind, or will they persist in a prideful independence? That, as we conceive it, is the deepest social problem of our contemporary age. The issue of human society on which all the future hangs is that of the relations between the Catholic Church and human society in its temporal aspects.

Pius XI formulated the three great conditions that must be observed in seeking this new accord, this new harmony, between the Church and temporal society. This new order to which we look forward must harmonize with, first of all, the exigencies of the eternal law which govern the action both of the Church and of the secular state and society. Moreover, it must harmonize also with the particular conditions of our particular epoch in history.

The first of those conditions is this, as we conceive it: Today, as in the Middle Ages and always, the Catholic Church will not accept exclusion from the affairs of the world. Her authority, it is true, is purely spiritual; nevertheless, all the problems of the world have a spiritual basis, spiritual origins, and she maintains, therefore, that she is competent in them. Consequently, the consciousness of her own divinity makes her naturally insist that her voice be heard and her authority respected when these problems come up for discussion and solution. She cannot permit willingly, gladly, that the world should organize itself without her, much less

⁸ I have not found this full phrase in the texts of Leo XIII, but Antonio Acerbi devotes a lengthy chapter to "Leone XIII: la Chiesa madre dei popoli," in his *Chiesa e democrazia. Da Leone XIII al Vaticano II* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero 1991), 3-83.

against her, because it is her conviction that that way lies disaster in the future as it has in the past.

Secondly, it is equally certain that the Church's mode of insertion of herself into the temporal order today cannot be and will not be that used in past ages, particularly in the medieval period. Today, we have around us civil society as a constituted entity. That historical process of the differentiation of the temporal and the spiritual has actually taken place, and, as I said, we do not wish to, and cannot if we wish to, turn back the clock of history. The fact is that civil society will not today accept, as once it accepted, the tutelage of the Catholic Church. The medieval formula for the relation between Church and state is no longer applicable today. That is certain. Hence, the Church has actually renounced that part of her mission, a secondary part of her mission, which consists in the direct guidance of temporal affairs. She has in our day formally retired from politics. That formal retirement, of course, was marked in a number of ways, for instance, in the Concordat struck between the Holy See and the Italian government. One of its results, of course, was the liquidation of the temporal power of the pope, save over that tiny bit of land over which he maintains his temporal sovereignty merely as a symbol of his spiritual independence, the independence of his spiritual authority. At the time of the Concordat, of course, the Italian clergy were forbidden to participate in political activity, especially through the means of that Partito popolare that was at the time a powerful influence. That same retirement of the Church from politics you have in the condemnation of the Action française by Pius XI, and later in the dissolution of the German Centrum by Pius XI, but under the leadership of Cardinal Pacelli at the time, the legate to Germany.

These two conditions, therefore, are clear. What they come down to is this: that nowadays there must reign, as there does reign, that full distinction between two societies, the spiritual and the temporal. Each, according to the formula of Leo XIII, is sovereign in its own domain and has all the right, all the authority, and all the prestige that belongs to it by reason of its particular function in history with reference to mankind.

Given that situation, namely, the Church's will to direct human affairs in the temporal order and her refusal to direct them by a direct insertion of herself into the temporal order, what now is the formula whereby, according to which, she is to fulfill her temporal mission, that mission of the penetration of the temporal by the spiritual to which she is committed, whose aim, as I said, is simply the creation here on earth of human institutions that will foster the spread and the growth of the divine life that she believes Christ brought to earth?

The action of the Church in the modern world for the solution of its problems is a purely spiritual action. She aims to direct nations to aid them in their task of creating a new human order simply by communicating to them a spirit, conforming to her own and conforming, therefore, she believes, to their own basic needs and their own highest aspirations. The Church and the state are to remain perfectly distinct. They ought to become one simply insofar as both share one common spirit.

To realize that spiritual communication between two orders of human society: that is the special task of what we call Catholic Action, and it is that task which gives it its novelty, its distinctiveness, its appropriateness to the modern context. The task, of course, is colossal. As yet, it has hardly been sketched; in fact, in many places (not to pun) it has been scotched, notably

in those countries that are now under the domination of Germany--Belgium, part of France, and Holland.

There are two means whereby the Church hopes to achieve a relative measure of success, at any rate, in this task of the penetration of the temporal by the spiritual. The first means is dictated by the very nature of the task to which she sets her hand. She must, first of all, develop new inner spiritual vitality, re-kindling the Spirit in all her members, both clerical and lay. That task is accomplished, of course, by the education of her members to a deeper intelligence of Christian doctrine, especially in its social aspects, accomplished too by the inculcation of a more selfless-spirited charity founded on the selflessness of humility, and the development, too, in them of a spirit of whole-souled, childlike dependence upon God and upon spiritual means, because it is only through that alliance with the divine energies of God himself that any measure of success can be achieved, even in a temporal order.

The second means whereby the Church hopes to accomplish her mission is by the communication to the laity of the basic preoccupation of conforming all things in human society to the laws of God and thus converting all human energies to the good of souls and to the solid prosperity of the secular order. That is one of the great tasks, of course, within the Catholic Church today, the formation of the laity to an intelligent and an intense spiritual life, that they may themselves form civil society and bring it into harmony with Christian principles.

Catholic Action, therefore, is a very vast and complicated thing. Its aim, of course, is simple enough: the reconstitution of a Christian temporal order. When I say a "Christian temporal order," I mean simply a social order in which a man can be a man without having to be a hero. The Church recognizes the fact that very few men are made of heroic stuff and that it is necessary to surround them with facilities for the practice, the achievement, of human life. It has to be made relatively easy, otherwise the mass of men will not actually rise to it. She aims, therefore, to create this social milieu in which a man can reach the truth and can walk in it and can live it; in other words, in which he can be a man. Of course, when I say "a man," I mean one who is a child of the Father in heaven, one who is a living member of Christ, one who is a temple of the Holy Spirit and His instrument for the unification of the world, because that is the Church's definition of manhood.

There are, therefore, several characteristics of this Catholic Action that I want to touch on simply in order to complete the picture. First of all, it is basically a lay action. In the Middle Ages, the Church's social apostolate was carried on almost exclusively by the clergy, the hierarchy. Today, the task of Christianizing mankind has passed very largely to the hands of the laity. The laity, of course, are not devoted to the construction of that specifically supernatural order, to the direct sanctification of souls, which is the work of the Catholic priesthood. They have only one part in the work of the Church, not the direct fostering of the divine life through the preaching of the Word of God, the administration of the Sacraments, or moral discipline; but their task is rather the creation of those earthly conditions which will be favorable to the growth of the divine life. They operate, therefore, in a temporal order and not where it touches the spiritual order. They do not operate in a directly, specifically spiritual supernatural order.

Secondly, this Catholic Action aims at being universal. It wishes to leave untouched no sphere of human life that has any bearing on the spiritual life and destiny of mankind.

It is, thirdly, a spiritual activity. That which promotes it is the Christian grace of baptism whereby the Christian, as we believe, partakes in the priestly office of Christ. Being a spiritual action, it has nothing to do with the formation of political parties nor has it anything to do with the creation of societies or organizations whose purpose is specifically economic. We don't aspire to the creation of Catholic chambers of commerce or anything such. That is not part of Catholic Action. Those activities do not possess that quality of spirituality which is the essential characteristic of Catholic Action.

It is, fourthly, a hierarchical action. I mean that the Catholic undertakes his Catholic Action not as a private individual, but as a member of the Church; and he conceives of his work as a participation in the total work of the Church, a work that is really one. Although it is divided, it is divided according to the constituted hierarchy that prevails in the Church. Each member performs a specialized task, but performs it in union with the Church. Sometimes the tasks, of course, are very modest, but the tasks are always Catholic, because they are part of a vast ensemble of tasks to which each individual makes his own particular contribution.

I say this action is hierarchical because it is not the individual Catholic's idea to establish between himself and the world these spiritual relationships. He is the means whereby the Church is to establish relations between herself and society. Catholic Action, as I said, is the modern form of relations between Church and State, relations that are established not now as they used to be between pope and Christian princes but between the Catholic and his fellow men in a particular social order. It is through the laity, who stand as it were on the frontier touching both the spiritual and the temporal, that the Church comes into contact with the temporal order.

Moreover, this action is essentially social and very deeply realistic. It doesn't proceed according to any particular abstract plan. The Catholic Actionist begins with real life just where he is. What he aims to transform is the daily ordinary life that he comes in contact with in his particular sphere in which Providence has put him. Each member of the Church seeks to do in his own or her own particular sphere that which it is her duty or his duty to do. That is the great principle laid down by Pius XI, that the apostles of the working class are to be working men. The sanctification of the various strata of human society--the various professions, or the various vocations, or avocations--is to be accomplished by those who belong to those particular vocations.

You see, therefore, what we hope will happen will be the formation of a new social order, not so much from the top down, as once it was formed, but rather from the bottom up, or I might perhaps more exactly say, from the bottom up and from the top down and from the middle both ways, because this Catholic Action aims to permeate in a spiritual fashion the whole social context in which we live today.

Our hope, therefore, is that there will be established a real entente between Church and human society, a harmony that will be real because it will not be imposed or exterior, but will be accomplished by a genuine penetration of a Christian human spirit into public life. Once that spirit is created and has permeated public life, we hope that it itself will create institutions favorable for its further development. There is no attempt at infringing any of the prerogatives of the state. There is no idea in Catholic Action of effecting any subordination of the state to the Church, although there is a very definite idea of effecting that necessary subordination of state

and of human society and every single individual in it to the eternal principles of the two, law and order [*sic*], to those eternal laws of human nature whose sanction is God.

The Church, therefore, in this spiritual fashion aims to re-assume the direction of the temporal order, not directly by authority, but indirectly by the multiple and united activity of all her members, each in his place, each penetrated by a full, integral Christian spirit, and all directed by the hierarchy.

Therefore, that is the general social program of the Church with its general purpose, that rapprochement of religion and society, that permeation of the temporal by the spiritual in which we believe all our future hope for humanity lies.

I have hardly the time, therefore--in fact, no time--to descend to any greater particulars, but I hope that this may give you at least an introductory idea to what is meant by Catholic Action. The idea could be clarified if we could follow it in more detail, but I was primarily interested in setting before you the governing principles of Catholic Action and its constituent elements.